.Bagely, in a 15 June 1965 memorandum to Helms (Who was by then DDCI, But still writing herd on the case), described the interviews as unrewarding in terms of producing new information or insights ... It was obvious that subject had given some thought ... To improving and smoothing over some of the rough spots in his story.”
By the end of 1965, there were others in the SR division who doubted the thesis, and one of them was willing to risk his career by putting his thoughts on paper in a 31 page memorandum to Bagely, commenting on the sterile version of the SR/CI’s notebook documenting the case against Nosenko. It began:
Introduction: At your request, I have read the basic Nosenko notebook and I hope you will honor my right to dissent. I find the evidence that Nosenko is a bona fide defector far more convincing than the evidence used in the notebook to condemn him as a KGB agent.
It is because I am concerned about the serious ramifications of a wrong verdict that I wish to set forth my dissenting views in considerable detail. If the present verdict of guilty is right I believe there must be satisfactory answers to the questions raised herein; if it is wrong, as I believe it is, it should be rectified as soon as possible.
Intelligence Production: There are several references to the Nosenko notebook to the extent and quality of the intelligence he provided. In the 25 March 1964 memo to DDP, it is asserted that “a comparison of his positive intelligence with that of other Soviet bloc intelligence officers with whom we have had an operational relationship shows that all of them were consistently better able to provide useful positive intelligence then has been Nosenko.”
Tab D the same memo states “his positive intelligence production is practically nil,” and later: “viewed overall, however, Nosenko’s positive intelligence production has been so meager for a man of his background, training and position as to cast doubts on his bona fides, without reference to other criteria.” All of these statements are incorrect.
The three persons in the clandestine services with the background and experience to make such a judgment regarding Nosenko’s production and access agree that they are incorrect. No KGB officer has been able to provide more useful intelligence than the Nosenko has; Experience has shown that intelligence usefulness of KGB officers in general is “practically nil”. Golytsin’s was Nil. Viewed in the proper context, therefore, Nosenko’s intelligence production cannot be used in his defense, but neither can it be said honestly to cast any doubt whatsoever on his bona fides. In the realm of substance, judgment regarding his bona fides must therefore be made on the basis of his counter intelligence information.
