https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10111-10250.pdf
104-10111-10250
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. Date: 18 Feb 1971
SUBJECT: Nosenko Case
1. On 18 Feb Mr. REDACTED chief/EUR/BNL told me that Mr. John Hart, C/EUR, had told him to tell only me the following.
When REDACTED was in Brussels, in late January, 1971, he was with Mr. Russell Hibbs, G5-14 case officer, for a long Wed. evening. REDACTED said that during their conversation, Hibbs spent a lot of time complaining about what Hibbs claimed was Mr. (Pete) Bagley’s, COS, reluctance to pursue and push investigations of AEDONOR leads. REDACTED said he would not attempt to relate what Hibbs said was the specific leads mentioned. The point he wanted to make sure I knew was Hibbs attitude towards Bagley as deliberately not following-up on AEDONOR leads. REDACTED said Hibbs was coming to Hq. in the Summer and he would let me know about the arrival in the event I wanted to talk to Hibbs.
2. My only contact was to thank REDACTED and tell him to let me know when Hibbs arrived.
(Copy to Solie)
SIGNATURE
Scott Miller
Note on p. 2: This information is not to be disseminated.
Any inquiry or interest in this memo should be brought
To the attention of DC/SRS, Bruce Solie
Michael,
John L. Hart, the guy who perjured himself in front of the HSCA?
What a piece of work
he was.
This is what Tennent H. Bagley had to say, on page 215 of Spy Wars, about a 1976 incident between himself and Hart:
While paying lip service to the need for vigilance, Colby saw counterintelligence mainly as an impediment to intelligence collection. His impatience and disinterest came out in the form of simplification and sarcasm. “I spent several long sessions doing my best to follow [Counterintelligence Staff chief Angleton’s] tortuous theories about the long arm of a powerful and wily KGB at work, over decades, placing its agents in the heart of allied and neutral nations and sending its false defectors to influence and under- mine American policy. I confess that I couldn’t absorb it, possibly because I did not have the requisite grasp of this labyrinthine subject, possibly because Angleton's explanations were impossible to follow, or possibly because the evidence just didn’t add up to his conclusions. ... I did not suspect Angleton and his staff of engaging in improper activities. I just could not figure out what they were doing at all.” (fn 17)
.
Colby soon got to work reorganizing the (Angleton's) Counterintelligence Staff and divesting it of some of its components. Then in 1974 the New York Times exposed the fact that in apparent violation of the Agency’s charter, Angleton’s staff had been checking international mail to and from some left-wing Americans. This gave Colby the ammunition he needed to rid himself of this nuisance. At the end of that year he demanded Angleton’s resignation and was glad to see Angleton’s chief lieutenants Raymond Rocca, William Hood, and Newton Miler follow him into retirement.
.
To steer a less troubling course, Colby appointed to head the Counterintelligence Staff George Kalaris, a man without experience in either counterintelligence or Soviet bloc operations, and, as his deputy, Leonard McCoy, a handler of reports, not an operations officer, who had already distinguished himself as a fierce advocate for Nosenko. Now began an extraordinary cleanup inside the (Angleton's) Counterintelligence Staff— and the disappearance of evidence against Nosenko. Miler’s carefully accumulated notes on this and related cases were removed from the files and disappeared, along with a unique card file of discrepancies in Nosenko’s statements. (fn 18)
.
Shortly afterward Colby appointed an officer to review the files anew.
John L. Hart was assisted by four officers. They worked for six months, from June to December 1976. I caught a glimpse of their aims and work methods when Hart came to Europe to interview me (in Belgium). He had not bothered to read what I had written (though he said nothing new had come to light on the question of Nosenko’s bona fides) and seemed interested only in why, eight years earlier, I had warned that bad consequences might flow from Nosenko’s release. I saw that his aim was not to get at the truth but to find a way to clear Nosenko, so I refused to talk further with him. As I later learned, Hart’s team did not even interview the Counterintelligence Staff officers who had analyzed the case and maintained files on it for nine years. Among them were two veteran analysts who, having come “cold” to the case, had concluded on their own that Nosenko was a plant— and had written their reasons. Hart then wrote a report that affirmed total trust in Nosenko. (fn 19)
.
Having decreed their faith and gotten rid of disbelievers, the CIA leadership banned further debate. One experienced officer in the Soviet Bloc Division— my old colleague Joe Westin, who knew so much about this case— took a late stand against Nosenko’s bona fides. He was told by higher-ups, “If you continue on this course, there will be no room for you in this Division”— and his future promotion was blocked. Peter Deriabin, who kept trying to warn Agency officials about Nosenko, was told to desist or his relations with CIA would be threatened (see Appendix A).
.
Nosenko’s rescuers then set out to discredit those who had distrusted him. They first labeled them as paranoid (a charge always difficult to refute) and then moved on to distort the record.
.....
Cheers!
-- MWT
