The BBN started with the noblest of intentions and ended as a farce.
It was thought, that analyzing the Dictabelt tape, they could deduce:
1. The position of the shooter.
2. The position of where the shot was aimed at, that is, where it stuck.
3. The position of the motorcycle with the stuck microphone.
Going into this, I sure Dr. Barger had hopes of getting excellent data. And if this excellent data showed the motorcycle was elsewhere, or was at Dealey Plaza but recorded three shots from the TSBD, that would be a disappointment. But, if he discovered multiple firing locations, it would be the greatest scientific crime discovery of the century. I am certain his hopes were up.
So, they ran some firing tests in Dealey Plaza on August 20, 1978, and recorded the shots on 36 microphones arranged along Houston and Elm Street.
Below is a simplified version of BBN’s Exhibit F-367, which shows the correlations that they discovered.
Test | Beginning Time of | Zap. | Rifle | Target |
ID | First impulse on | Frame | Location | Location |
| Tape Segments (sec) | (Thomas) |
|
|
|
A | 136.20 |
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|
|
B | 137.70 | 176 | TSBD | Location-z 155 |
D | 137.70 | 176 | TSBD | Location-z 313 |
E | 137.70 | 176 | KNOLL | Location- Tague |
|
|
|
G | 139.27 | 205 | TSBD | Location-z 313 |
I | 139.27 | 205 | TSBD | Location-z 313 |
J | 139.27 | 205 | KNOLL | Location-z 313 |
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|
|
K | 140.32 | 224 | TSBD | Location-z 313 |
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|
|
L | 145.15 | 313 | KNOLL | Location-z 313 |
M | 145.15 | 313 | TSBD | Location-z 224 |
N | 145.15 | 313 | TSBD | Location-z 313 |
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|
|
O | 145.61 | 321 | TSBD | Location-z 313 |
P | 145.61 | 321 | TSBD | Location- Tague |
Q | 145.61 | 321 | TSBD | Location-z 224 |
|
|
|
R | 146.30 |
The “Zap. Frames” are Dr. Thomas’s estimate, not the original BBN estimate. They don’t differ by enough to make much of a difference so to avoid confusion, I just went with Dr. Thomas’s time estimate.
On this table, I don’t differentiate between the rifle in the TSBD being 2 feet behind the plane of the window, or sticking out further. It didn’t seem to make a lot of difference in the firing tests. So, I just consider these shots to be from the TSBD.
In the August 20, 1978 firing tests, they fired at four locations. Target 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Target 1 is about where the limousine was at the location shown in Zapruder frame z155.
Target 2 is about where the limousine was at the location shown in Zapruder frame z224.
Target 3 is about where the limousine was at the location shown in Zapruder frame z313.
Target 4 is about Mr. Tague was standing, about 240 feet beyond the z313 location.
So instead of listing the “Target Location” as “3”, I give it as “Location-z 313”.
So, how did they do?
1. The position of the shooter.
Terrible.
Shot 1 at z176 - They got correlations found for both the TSBD and the Grassy Knoll. There should have only been a correlation for one location. One of these results must be bad. The degree of correlation was not high enough,
Shot 2 at z205 – Again, bad, correlations found for both the TSBD and the Grassy Knoll.
Shot 3 at z224 – One correlation for a shot from the TSBD. Getting just one correlation is actually good. It’s too bad they didn’t get this for all 5 shots.
Shot 4 at z304 – Again, bad, correlations found for both the TSBD and the Grassy Knoll.
Shot 5 at z313 – Correlations only for a shot from the TSBD. This is a good result.
2. The position of where the shot was aimed at, that is, where it stuck.
Shot 1 at z176 – the shot struck at:
Location-z 155 – miss by 19 feet.
Location-z 313 – miss by 132 feet.
Location- Tague – miss by 272 feet.
Shot 2 at z205 – the shot struck at:
Location-z 313 – miss by 92 feet.
Shot 3 at z224 – the shot struck at:
Location-z 313 – miss by 75 feet.
Shot 4 at z304 – the shot struck at:
Location-z 224 – miss by 70 feet.
Location-z 313 – a hit on the limousine
Shot 5 at z313 – the shot struck at:
Location-z 224 – miss by 75 feet.
Location-z 313 – a hit on the limousine
Location- Tague – miss by 240 feet.
One the whole, terrible. The data contradicts itself. Clearly false correlations are more common than true.
Dr. Barger doesn’t seem the least bit phase. When the results contradict themselves, we should just assume we got some “false alarms”. We should just ignore the ones that don’t make sense and consider the ones that do reliable. These “false alarms” are a serious problem. They are more properly known as “false positives”. So many false positives in the data, where false positives are more common then true positives, bring all the true positives into doubt.
And if we follow Dr. Barger, throw out
all the “false alarms”, what proposed shots have good support:
Shot 1 – at z152 – good support (a miss by 19 feet is good enough), if the two false positives are ignored.
Shot 2 – at z205 – no support, all correlations give unbelievable “Target location” that is off by 92 feet.
Shot 3 – at z224 – no support, the correlation gives unbelievable “Target location” that is off by 75 feet.
Shot 4 – at z304 – good support, if the two false positives are ignored.
Shot 5 – at z313 – good support, if the two false positives are ignored.
Two of the five “found” shots, strictly speaking, should be thrown out, because misses by 70 feet or more is just too unbelievable.
3. The position of the motorcycle with the stuck microphone.
Here we have much better correlations. These correlations are what Mr. Griffith really likes to emphasis.
The data is consistent with a motorcycle traveling at around 11 mph, trailing behind the limousine by 120 to 160 feet. Which should plausible. But there is a problem with the film evidence. The Hughes film shows the only possible officer, Officer McLain, along with his partner, Officer Baker, trailing behind the limousine by 300 feet. By the time the film shuts off, Officer McLain has 1.5 seconds to cover 170 feet, impossible. Also, he should appear in the Altgens photograph.
But let’s ignore all that. We still, seemingly, have a remarkable correlation with the data and a plausible set of positions of the motorcycle. What are we to make of this data as a whole? Random looking correlations for the position of the shooter and the area of the street the bullets struck. Good correlation for the position of the motorcycle. This is truly hot ice and wondrous strange snow.
But there is a simple explanation. For a through check of all possible correlations:
432 strip charts from the 1978 firing tests, 36 microphones times 12 test shots
Need to be each compared with the 6 possible shots from the 1963 Dictabelt recording.
So, 2,592 comparisons need to be made between pairs of strip charts for the 1978 tests and the 1963 recording.
This sounds difficult to do in 15 days, to get done in time to present the data to the HSCA. They have to:
Decide which of the 1978 78 test shots are to be compared, they selected 12 of them.
Print out 12 strip charts for them.
Print out 432 strip charts for the 1978 data.
Make all 2,592 comparisons, which involve counting waves within a certain number of milliseconds and doing some calculations to get a “correlation coefficient”
Organize all the data and print them out in a neat form to present to the HSCA.
I would suggest that maybe they did not perform all 2,592 combinations of comparisons. From one shot, it seemed the motorcycle was 150 feet behind. With the time limit, it made sense to only search for where the motorcycle might be. Why search the data from a stretch of street that you probably wouldn’t find a motorcycle. And if a correlation was found about where expected, 150 feet behind, under the time pressure, it’s time to move on to the next shot.
If something like this happened, all the correlations found would be consistent with a motorcycle averaging 11 mph, 120 to 160 feet behind the limousine. Even if a through processing of the entire data set may have found many contradictions on the location of the motorcycle, just as was found with the location of the shooter and the location of the target.
Until proven otherwise, I hold that this is the most likely scenario that explains this “hot ice and wondrous strange snow” results.
Dr. Barger’s fundamental error, is that he allowed his hopes to affect his judgement. These “false alarms”, should have set off a real alarm in his head. It should have been apparent to him that he was measuring “noise”, garbage data that contradicted itself which was what data is that contains too many false positives. This work will be his legacy, it will overshadow everything else he was done in his career. He has gone from being a respected scientist to having an insect expert as his main ally.