Senator John F. Kennedy, US Senate, April 6, 1954:
'Mr. President, the time has come for the American people to be
told the blunt truth about Indochina.
I am reluctant to make any statement which may be misinterpreted
as unappreciative of the gallant French struggle at Dien Bien Phu
and elsewhere; or as partisan criticism of our Secretary of State
just prior to his participation in the delicate deliberations in
Geneva. Nor, as one who is not a member of those committees of
the Congress which have been briefed--if not consulted--on this
matter, do I wish to appear impetuous or alarmist in my evaluation
of the situation.
But to pour money, material, and men into the jungles of Indochina without
at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile
and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of "united action" assumes
the inevitability of such victory; but such assumptions are not unlike
similar predictions of confidence which have lulled the American people
for many years and which, if continued, would present an improper
basis for determining the extent of American participation.
Despite this series of optimistic reports about eventual victory,
every member of the Senate knows that such victory today appears
to be desperately remote, to say the least, despite tremendous
amounts of economic and materiel aid from the United States, and
despite a deplorable loss of French Union manpower. The call
for either negotiations or additional participation by other nations
underscores the remoteness of such a final victory today, regardless
of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu. It is, of course, for these reasons
that many French are reluctant to continue the struggle without
greater assistance; for to record the sapping effect which time
and the enemy have had on their will and strength in that area
is not to disparage their valor. If "united action" can achieve the
necessary victory over the forces of communism, and thus preserve the
security and freedom of all Southeast Asia, then such united action is
clearly called for. But if, on the other hand, the increase in
our aid and the utilization of our troops would only result in
further statements of confidence without ultimate victory over
aggression, then now is the time when we must evaluate the conditions
under which that pledge is made.
I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military
assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere
and at the same time nowhere, "an enemy of the people" which has
the sympathy and covert support of the people.
Moreover, without political independence for the Associated States, the
other Asiatic nations have made it clear that they regard this
as a war of colonialism; and the "united action" which is said
to be so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely
to end up as unilateral action by our own country. Such intervention,
without participation by the armed forces of the other nations
of Asia, without the support of the great masses of the people
of the Associated States, with increasing reluctance and discouragement
on the part of the French--and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese
Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation
of our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground--such
intervention, Mr. President, would be virtually impossible in
the type of military situation which prevails in Indochina.
This is not a new point, of course. In November of 1951, I reported upon
my return from the Far East as follows:
In Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort
of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire. There
is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam government among
the people of that area. To check the southern drive of communism
makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms.
The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment
within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather
than upon the legions of General de Lattre. To do this apart from
and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed
failure.
In June of last year, I sought an amendment to the Mutual Security Act
which would have provided for the distribution of American aid,
to the extent feasible, in such a way as to encourage the freedom
and independence desired by the people of the Associated States
My amendment was soundly defeated on the grounds that we should
not pressure France into taking action on this delicate situation;
and that the new French government could be expected to make "a
decision which would obviate the necessity of this kind of amendment
or resolution." The distinguished majority leader [Mr. Knowland]
assured us that "We will all work, in conjunction with our great
ally, France, toward the freedom of the people of those states."
Every year we are given three sets of assurances: First, that
the independence of the Associated States is now complete; second,
that the independence of the Associated States will soon be completed
under steps "now" being undertaken; and, third, that military victory
for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just
around the corner, or lies two years off. But the stringent limitations
upon the status of the Associated States as sovereign states remain;
and the fact that military victory has not yet been achieved is
largely the result of these limitations. Repeated failure of these
prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the frequency of
their reiteration, and they have caused this nation to delay definitive
action until now the opportunity for any desirable solution may
well be past.
It is time, therefore, for us to face the stark reality of the
difficult situation before us without the false hopes which predictions
of military victory and assurances of complete independence have
given us in the past. The hard truth of the matter is, first,
that without the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated
States, without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable
officer corps, a military victory, even with American support,
in that area is difficult if not impossible, of achievement; and,
second, that the support of the people of that area cannot be
obtained without a change in the contractual relationships which
presently exist between the Associated States and the French Union.
If the French persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate
independence and freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated
States; and if those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain
aloof from the conflict, as they have in the past, then it is
my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance
at Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men
and machines into that hopeless internecine struggle.
The facts and alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But
in a nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest
appreciation of such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy can be
effectively maintained. In an era of supersonic attack and atomic
retaliation, extended public debate and education are of no avail, once
such a policy must be implemented. The time to study, to doubt, to review,
and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may well rest the peace and
security of the world, and, indeed, the very continued existence
of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this decision to the people,
then, as Thomas Jefferson once said: "If we think them not enlightened
enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the
remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion
by education."
