Just came across this from my files.
And somebody somewhere said that particular ammo has a narrow wound path (which would partially explain the careful probing, one might think)
Subject: JFK_ SECTION II.--PERFORMANCE OF AUTOPSY
Date: 21 July, 2014 11:59:53 PM EDT
The following is from Volume 7 of the HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS:
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/autopsy3.txt SECTION II.--PERFORMANCE OF AUTOPSY
PART I. INTRODUCTION
(27) Throughout the last 15 years, many critics have
questioned the competency and validity of the autopsy of
President Kennedy. The efforts of the U.S. Department of the Navy
and other Government sources to insure privacy with respect to
the autopsy procedures and other events that took place at
Bethesda Naval Hospital have contributed in part to much of the
uncertainty and skepticism. Included in these efforts was an
order of silence issued to the participants in the autopsy. (1)
(28) Because of this skepticism and in accordance with its
mandate to conduct a full and complete investigation into the
circumstances surrounding the death of President Kennedy, the
committee decided to investigate the performance of the autopsy.
The focus was to be on the following issues:
1. The possibility that someone ordered or
otherwise strongly suggested that the autopsy
doctors perform a limited or incomplete
autopsy;
2. The question of the competency and validity of
the autopsy; and
3. The documentation of the events that occurred,
how they occurred, and when they occurred.
(29) The committee conducted a review of all documentary
evidence and contacted almost all persons still alive who had
attended the autopsy. The Department of the Navy agreed to
rescind the orders of silence issued to the autopsy personnel.
(30) The following material relates the issues and
corresponding facts chronologically (part II) and then presents
the conclusions of the committee.
(31) The evidence indicates that while the pathologists
were given authority to perform a complete autopsy, the autopsy
was not complete according to established medicolegal standards.
PART II. FACTS AND ISSUES
Background
(32) At 1:30 p.m., eastern standard time (e.s.t.), on
November 22, 1963, President Kennedy and Governor Connally were
shot while riding in a Presidential motorcade, through the
streets of Dallas, Tex. The driver of the Presidential limousine,
Secret Service Agent William Grier, immediately drove the
limousine at high speed to Parkland Memorial Hospital, Dallas,
Tex. arriving at approximately 1:35 p.m., e.s.t.(2) Having been
alerted to the emergency by radio, Parkland Hospital personnel
quickly escorted the wounded President and Governor into the
emergency treatment facilities.
(33) Drs. Malcolm Perry and Charles J. Carrico were two of
the first doctors to attend the President. In addition to a
massive head wound, both observed a small, circular wound
situated in the region of the neck below the adam's apple, which
they subsequently characterized as an entry wound. (3) To combat
the President's failure to breathe, Dr. Perry decided to perform
a tracheotomy.(4) In doing so, he cut through the small, circular
neck wound, making it difficult to identify the missile wound.
(34) With respect to the head wound, Dr. Robert McClelland,
another the doctors who attended the President, said in his
testimony before the Warren Commission, that the right posterior
section of the skull had been blasted. (6) Dr. Kemp Clark, who
also assisted with the President, similarly described the wound
as being in the back of the President's head--in the right
posterior part. (7)
(35) The Parkland doctors soon realized their efforts to
save President Kennedy were fruitless. Dr. Clark pronounced him
dead at 2 p.m., e.s.t.(
(36) The total time that the doctors had observed or
treated the President was approximately 20 minutes. They had
been concerned only with administering emergency treatment. Their
primary concern was to restore the breathing and stop the
bleeding. None examined the President's back--and so did not
discover any wound there. Further, none observed any wound to the
head other than the one massive wound. Nor was their job to
measure precisely the location of the wounds or to examine the
body for all possible wounds. When the President died, the
Parkland doctors' functions also ended. (9)
(37) Drs. Robert Shaw, Charles Gregory, and George Shires
treated the wounds of Governor Connally. (10) In their medical
reports, they described wounds to his chest, wrist, and thigh.
(38) Soon after Dr. Kemp Clark of Parkland Hospital,
Dallas, Tex., pronounced the President dead, the Secret Service
and other personnel proceeded to transport the body from Texas to
Washington, D.C. While in flight, Mrs. Kennedy chose Bethesda
Naval Hospital in Bethesda, Md., as the site for the autopsy,
since the President had served in the Navy. (11)
(39) The Secret Service and the Navy Department made
arrangements for the performance of the autopsy. (12) The surgeon
general the Navy and the commanding officer of the Naval Medical
School advised Comdr. James J. Humes, the director of
laboratories of the National Medical School, (13) Naval Medical
Center, Bethesda, Md., that the Secret Service was transporting
the body of the President to Bethesda and that he was to
ascertain the cause of death. (14)
(40) The FBI authorities contacted their Baltimore field
office and advised that arrangements should be made for Bureau
agents to proceed to Andrews Air Force Base, Camp Springs, Md.,
to meet Air Force One and to handle any matters that would fall
within FBI jurisdiction.(15) Consequently, Special Agents Francis
X. O'Neill, Jr., and James W. Sibert proceeded to Andrews Air
Force Base. Their specific instructions were to accompany the
body at all times, ride in the motorcade to Bethesda Naval
Hospital, witness the autopsy, preserve the chain of custody of
any evidentiary material, and transport any bullets that might be
recovered to the FBI Laboratory.
(41) On arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, a motorcade
transported the body of the President to the Bethesda Naval
Hospital, (17) with Special Agents Sibert and O'Neill traveling
in the third car. (18) At Bethesda, the ambulance first stopped
at the main entrance; Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy and Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy got out (19) and joined other members
of the Kennedy family on the 17th floor of the hospital to await
the conclusion of the autopsy. (20) The ambulance then proceeded
to the rear of the building, arriving at approximately 7:35
p.m.(21). Personnel carried the body into the hospital. (22)
(42) Dr. Humes chose J. Thornton Boswell, M.D., chief of
pathology at Bethesda, (23) and Pierre A. Finck, M.D., chief of
the military environmental pathology division and chief of the
wound ballistics pathology branch at the Armed Forces Institute
of Pathology at Walter Reed Medical Center, (241) to assist him
in performing the autopsy. During the autopsy, Special Agents
Sibert and O'Neill recorded the names of what they believed were
all the persons in attendance at any time. (25) In a report they
submitted subsequent the autopsy, they included: (26)
1. Adm. Calvin B. Galloway, commanding officer of the U.N.
[sic] National Naval Medical Center;
2. Adm. George C. Burkley, White House physician to the
President;
3. Comdr. James J. Humes, director of the laboratories of
the National Medical School, Naval Medical Center,
Bethesda, Md.;
4. Capt. James H. Stover, Jr., commanding officer of the
Naval Medical School;
5. John Thomas Stringer, Jr., medical photographer;
6. James H. Ebersole, assistant chief radiologist at the
Bethesda Naval Medical Center;
7. Floyd Albert Riebe, medical photographer;
8. J. Thornton Boswell, chief of pathology at Bethesda;
9. Jan Gail Rudnicki, laboratory technologist, assisting Dr.
Boswell;
10. Pierre A. Finck, M.D., chief of the military
environmental pathology division and chief of the wound
ballistics pathology branch at Walter Reed Medical
Center; (27)
11. Paul K. O'Conner, laboratory technologist;
12. Jerrol F. Custer, X-ray technician;
13. James Curtis Jenkins, laboratory technologist;
14. Edward F. Reed, X-ray technician;
15. James E. Metzler, hospital corpsman third-class;
16. Capt. David Osborne, chief of surgery;
17. Brig. Gen. Godfrey McHugh, Air Force aide to the
President;
18. Lt. Comdr. Gregory H. Cross, resident in surgery;
19. Gen. Philip C. Wehle, commanding officer of the U.S.
Military District, Washington, D.C.;
20. Chester H. Boyers, chief petty officer in charge of the
pathology division;
21. Dr. George Bakeman, U.S. Navy (the committee could not
locate this person);
22. Secret Service Agent Roy Kellerman;
23. Secret Service Agent William Greer; and
24. Secret Service Agent John J. O'Leary. (28)
(43) Through its own investigation, the committee
determined that the following persons also attended the autopsy:
1. Richard A. Lipsey, personal aide to General Wehle;(29)
and
2. Samuel Bird,(30) in 1963, a lieutenant stationed at the
ceremonial duties office, Fort Myers, Va., 3d Infantry
Division.
(44) Additionally, Sibert and O'Neill reported that,
following the autopsy, four persons from Gawler's Funeral Home in
Washington, D.C., entered the autopsy room to prepare the
President's body for burial. They were:
1. John Van Haeson;
2. Edwin Stroble;
3. Thomas Robinson; and
4. Mr. Hagen.(31)
(45) These persons, together with Sibert and O'Neill, were
the only ones present at any time in the autopsy room with the
body of the President.
(46) In their report, Sibert and O'Neill noted that the
body of the President was removed from the casket in which it
arrived and placed on the autopsy table.(32) They said that a
sheet covered the entire body; an additional wrapping, saturated
in blood, surrounded the head. (33)
(47) Dr. Humes had testified previously to the Warren
Commission that the body was received in a casket, was wrapped in
a sheet, and was unclothed.(34) James Jenkins, a student
laboratory technician, whose normal duties included admitting a
body to the morgue and conducting an initial examination,
likewise stated that the body of the President was unclothed and
that it may have been wrapped in a sheet. (35)
(48) A major issue in the initial stages of the autopsy was
whether Dr. Humes had authority to perform a full or partial
autopsy.
(49) The belief that Dr. Humes had authority for only a
partial autopsy derived from several factors. Special Agent
O'Neill told the committee that he recalled that Mrs. Kennedy had
given permission for a partial autopsy and that Dr. Burkley, the
President's physician, reiterated her remarks in the autopsy
room. (36) He believed there was no question that Dr. Burkley was
conveying the wishes of the Kennedy family regarding a
full-versus-partial autopsy.(37) Special Agent Sibert told the
committee that he, too, had the impression the Kennedy family was
somehow transmitting step-by-step clearances to the pathologists.
(38)
(50) John Stringer, the medical photographer, likewise
recalled some discussion at the beginning of the autopsy
concerning the scope of the autopsy. He said he believed Dr.
Burkley played a central role in the discussions and seemed to be
acting on behalf of the Kennedy family.(39) He specifically
recalled Dr. Burkley indicating to the doctors that they should
not conduct a full autopsy, saying, "* * * (you) shouldn't do a
complete one if (you) don't have to."(40)
(51) Adm. David Osborne (then captain) stated that at the
beginning of the autopsy there was tremendous pressure to perform
a "quick post" and to leave the hospital. (41)
(52) The evidence supports the above recollections. They
reflect the general nature of the initial stages of the autopsy:
somewhat confused at the beginning with discussions concerning
the extent and nature of the autopsy to be performed. The
evidence also indicates, however, that these observations do not
reflect the total picture and that Dr. Humes ultimately received
permission to perform a complete autopsy. The following
memorandum is a primary source:
DATE: NOVEMBER 26, 1963.
SAC, Baltimore.
From: SA's James W. Sibert and Francis X. O'Neill, Jr.
Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
Following arrival at the Naval Medical Center and
preparation of the President's body for inspection and
autopsy, to be performed by Dr. Humes, chief
pathologist and commander, U.S. Navy, Admiral Burkley,
the President's personal physician advised that Mrs.
Kennedy had granted permission for a limited autopsy
and he questioned any feasibility for a complete
autopsy to obtain the bullet which had entered the
President's back.
At this point, it will be noted Dr. Humes, as the
physician conducting the autopsy, stated it was his
opinion that the bullet was still in the President's
body and could only be extracted through a complete
autopsy, which he proposed to do.
Special Agent Roy Kellerman, Secret Service, in
conference with Special Agents Sibert and O'Neill, from
an investigative and protective standpoint, advised
Admiral Burkley that it was felt the bullet should be
located.
At this point, Adm. C.B. Galloway, Commanding
Officer of the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda,
Md., told Commander Humes to perform a complete
autopsy.
(53) Special Agent O'Neill corroborated the information in
this memorandum in an affidavit and in his interview with the
committee.(42) In addition, Admiral Osborne (the Captain) stated
in a committee interview that Dr. Humes was successful in
resisting pressure to perform an incomplete autopsy and that no
one issued any orders limiting it. (43) Admiral Galloway also
stated that no one transmitted any orders to limit the autopsy in
any manner and that this memorandum was consistent with his
recollections.
(54) For these reasons, it may be concluded that Dr. Humes
possessed authority to perform a complete autopsy.
(55) During the initial stages of the autopsy, when the
discussion over a full-versus-partial autopsy occurred, the
pathologists conducted an examination of the exterior of the body
and took photographs and X-rays before making any incisions. (45)
This is when the pathologists observed that a tracheostomy had
been performed on the President.(46)
(56) Stringer(47) and Riebe(48) took the autopsy
photographs under the direction of Dr. Humes. Stringer told the
committee that his equipment included a 4- by 5-inch graphic view
camera that had standard lens and used film holders which
contained one segment of film on each side.(49) He also stated
that as he photographed the body, he would give the film to a
Secret Service agent standing adjacent to him who later signed a
receipt to Captain Stover to obtain formal custody of the
film.(50) Such a receipt--from Capt. J. H. Stover, Jr.,
commanding officer of the U.S. Naval Medical School to Roy H.
Kellerman, assistant special agent in charge, U.S. Secret
Service--does exist. (51)
(57) Stringer also stated that a Federal agent took a
camera from Riebe and exposed the film. (52) This apparently
occurred because the agent felt Stringer was the only person
authorized to photograph the body and that Riebe was only to
assist Stringer and not take photographs on his own initiative.
(58) Special Agents Sibert and O'Neill confirmed that the
pathologists had X-rays taken before and after making
incisions.(53) Dr. Ebersole, the acting chief of the radiology
department that evening, stated in a deposition to the committee
that prior to commencing the autopsy he took several X-rays of
the skull, chest and trunk of the body. (54) He stated that he
used portable X-ray equipment (55) and did not take X-rays of the
hands and feet.(56) Dr. Ebersole further told the committee that
he hand carried these films in their cassettes to the fourth
floor of the hospital, where a darkroom technician developed them
and then returned them to him. Ebersole then hand carried them
back to the autopsy room. (57)
(59) After completion of the autopsy, before releasing the
X-rays, Dr. Ebersole received a receipt from Roy H. Kellerman
acknowledging possession of them.
(60) Sibert and O'Neill observed that, on the basis of the
preliminary X-rays, the pathologists concluded that:
* * * no complete bullet of any size could be located in the
brain area and likewise no bullet could be located in the
back or any other area of the body as determined by total
body X-rays. (59)
(61) At approximately 8:15 p.m., e.s.t, Dr. Humes made the
first incision. (60) In his Warren Commission testimony, he
stated that he used a routine incision:
Which is a Y-shaped incision from the shoulders over the
lower portion of the breastbone and over to the opposite
shoulder and reflected the skin and tissues from the
interior portion of the chest. (61)
(62) Dr. Humes then began examining the missile wounds.
Sibert and O'Neill noted that he located the track of a missile
that appeared to enter the rear of the head and progress forward.
(62) The X-rays of the skull revealed numerous minute fragments
widely distributed throughout the skull, as well as two larger
fragments. The pathologists commented that this indicated the
missile had fragmented on passing through the skull. (63)
(63) Dr. Humes located the entrance of the missile track in
the head as approximately 2.5 centimeters laterally to the right
and slightly above the external occipital protuberance. (64)
(64) In the autopsy report, Dr. Humes described the exit
as:
A large irregular defect of the scalp and skull on the right
involving chiefly the parietal bone but extending somewhat
into the temporal and occipital regions. (65)
He further stated that:
n this region there is an actual absence of scalp and
bone producing a defect which measures approximately 13
centimeters in greatest diameter. (66).
(65) Sibert and O'Neill observed that Dr. Humes removed two
fragments from the right side of the skull; one 7 by 2
millimeters in size, the other 1 by 3 millimeters.(67) Special
Agents Sibert and O'Neill signed a receipt for custody of these
fragments and immediately following the autopsy transported them
to Special Agent Kurt Frazier at the FBI Laboratory. (68)
(66) The receipt for the fragments has been a continuing
source of controversy. It states that Bureau agents received a
"missile," (69) as opposed to two fragments. Chester H. Boyers,
the corpsman who typed the receipt,(70) submitted an affidavit to
the committee which stated that the receipt was for two fragments
that Dr. Humes removed from the skull, despite the receipt's
caption of "a missile." (71) Boyers emphasized that he gave
Sibert and O'Neill only missile fragments.
In affidavits and committee interviews, Sibert and O'Neill
also stated that Dr. Humes had retrieved two fragments and that
they received these fragments and not a missile. (73)
(67) The evidence indicates that the receipt was in error
and that Boyers transferred only fragments to Sibert and O'Neill.
(68) Sibert and O'Neill next observed in their report that
Dr. Humes examined a wound situated below the shoulders and 2
inches to the right of the middle line of the spinal column.(74)
In the autopsy report, Dr. Humes characterized this wound as an
entrance wound and located it 14 centimeters from the tip of the
right acromion process and 14 centimeters below the tip of the
right mastoid process. (75) Dr. Humes probed this wound with his
finger and concluded that the missile had only traveled a short
distance because he could feel the end track with his finger.(76)
During the autopsy, Dr. Humes stated that he and his colleagues
opened the chest cavity and carefully examined the lining of the
chest cavity and both lungs.(77) Admiral Galloway told the
committee that the pathologists examined the brain and all of the
internal organs and structures. These included the liver, heart,
lungs, spleen, kidneys, and adrenal glands.(78) The autopsy
protocol and supplemental report state that the doctors examined
the chest cavity, lungs, heart, abdominal cavity, skeletal
system, liver, spleen, kidneys, and brain, but did not list the
adrenal glands.(79)
(69) In regard to the examination of the chest cavity, Dr.
Humes told the Warren Commission and the committee that he
specifically remembered the photographers taking Kodachrome
photographs of the interior of the President's chest. (80)
Stringer, one of the photographers, stated that he also thought
he had taken some interior photographs of the President's chest.
(81) Dr. Burkley, however, told the committee that no one took
any photographs of the interior of the chest. (82) There is no
evidence that such photographs exist.
(70) By this point in the autopsy, the pathologists had
closely examined the body and had still not located any missile,
particularly the one which entered the back. They could not
explain why they could not find any bullets.(83) They then began
speculating about bullets which fragment. Special Agent Sibert
decided to call Special Agent Charles L. Killion at the firearms
section of the FBI laboratory to inquire about fragmenting
bullets.(84) On receiving this call, Killion informed Sibert that
Secret Service Agent Richard Johnson had forwarded to the
laboratory a bullet which reportedly had been found on a
stretcher in the emergency room of Parkland Memorial Hospital in
Dallas, Tex. (85) Killion described the bullet as a
6.5-millimeter rifle missile with a copper-alloy full jacket.
(86)
(71) Sibert and O'Neill stated in their report that during
the autopsy Dr. Humes, concluded on the basis of this information
and knowing that the Parkland doctors had performed cardiac
massage that they may have forced the bullet out of the
President's back. (87) This theory would account for a missile
track with no bullet.
(72) During the latter stages of the autopsy, authorities
sent from Dallas three separate fragments of skull bone (88)
found in the Presidential limousine. There is no evidence to show
who sent these fragments to Bethesda. The pathologists concluded
they were from the skull. Dr. Humes directed the X-raying of
these fragments(89) and observed that one of the fragments
contained minute metallic fragments along a line which
corresponded with the large defect in the skull of the
President.(90) This particular bone fragment alone exhibited
beveling of the outer table which Pierre Finck said indicated
that a missile exited at that point.(91) Both Dr. Humes and Dr.
Burkley informed the committee that these fragments were placed
back in the skull of the President. (92)
(73) By the termination of the autopsy at approximately 11
p.m.,(93) the pathologist had formulated the following general
conclusions:
1. One missile entered in the rear of the skull of the
President and exited in the front of the skull; and
2. One missile entered the back of the President and was
apparently dislodged during cardiac massage at Parkland
Hospital.
(74) Admiral Galloway corroborated these statements before
the committee, saying that an assassin or assassins shot the
President from behind with two shots. (95)
(75) After completing the autopsy, Dr. Humes remained to
assist the morticians in preparing the President's body. (96)
Secret Service Agent Kellerman said that after the morticians had
prepared the body, the Secret Service agents and the Kennedy
family left the hospital at 3:56 a.m. and went to the White
House. (97)
Additional issues arising from
the performance of the autopsy
(76) Although Dr. Humes had authority to perform a complete
autopsy, the committee still had to resolve the issue of the
actual scope of the autopsy. Specifically, Dr. Humes may have
decided on his own initiative to limit the autopsy in certain
respects or, despite the initial grant of authority, some factors
may possibly have surfaced during the course of the autopsy which
may have impinged on the independent decisionmaking of Dr. Humes.
(77) Dr. Pierre Finck, one of the pathologists, asserted in
a sworn statement to the committee that he believed the autopsy
was incomplete.
Because of the restrictions I suggested or said I felt
it was not complete, but Dr. Humes then said that the
autopsy had accomplished the purposes as stated-the
number of wounds, the direction of the projectiles and
the cause of death so I was actually satisfied. (98)
Dr. Finck later stated that restrictions from the family (were)
the reason for limiting our actions. (99) Specifically, Dr. Finck
contends that someone ordered them (the pathologists) not to
dissect the missile track that began in the upper back and
progressed forward into the neck region. When questioned about
the source of this order, Dr. Finck stated:
I cannot say that it was this army general, I can't
recall that precisely. I remember the prosecutors and
Admiral Galloway. As far as saying now so and so told
me that or didn't tell me that, it is extremely
difficult. There was an army general in that room and I
cannot readily pinpoint the origin of those
instructions to comply with those family wishes. (100)
(78) The committee determined that it was Dr. Humes and not
any army general or other person who made the decision not to
dissect the back entry wound. The following exchange between one
of the medical consultants for the committee and Dr. Humes
supports this conclusion:
Dr. BADEN. Now, for example, not exploring the wound from
the back to the neck, that was not done. I mean, cutting it
open completely. That wasn't done specifically; was that
because somebody said, "Don't do it"?
Dr. HUMES. Now wait a minute, that wound was excised.
Dr. BADEN. The back wound?
Dr. HUMES. Yes, sir. The back of the neck, and there are
microscopic slides of that wound.
Dr. BADEN. I see. The skin was taken out. And then was --
Dr. HUMES. It was probed.
Dr. BADEN. Was it opened up?
Dr. HUMES. It was not laid open.
Dr. BADEN. Now that was your decision as opposed to somebody
else's decision?
Dr. HUMES. Yes. It was mine. (101)
(79) The committee also investigated the possibility that
the Kennedy family may have unduly influenced the pathologists
once the autopsy began, possibly by transmitting messages by
telephone into the autopsy room. Brig. Gen. Godfrey McHugh, then
an Air Force military aide to the President, informed the
committee that Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and Kenneth
O'Donnell, a presidential aide, frequently telephoned him during
the autopsy from the 17th floor suite. (102) McHugh said that on
occasions, Kennedy and O'Donnell asked only to speak with
him.(103) They inquired about the results, why the autopsy was
consuming so much time, and the need for speed and efficiency,
while still performing the required examinations. (104) McHugh
said he forwarded this information to the pathologists, never
stating or implying that the doctors should limit the autopsy in
any manner, but merely reminding them to work as efficiently and
quickly as possible.(105)
(80) While General McHugh or others may not have stated or
implied that the doctors should limit the autopsy, their remarks
no doubt caused consternation, although they may not have
substantively affected the autopsy. The following passage
explains this view:
(81) Dr. HUMES. There were no questions but we were being
urged to expedite this examination as quickly as
possible, that members of the President's family were
in the building, that they refused to leave the
premises until the President's body was ready to be
moved; and similar remarks of the vein which we made
every effort to put aside and approach the
investigation in as scientific a manner as we could.
But did it harass us and cause difficulty--of course it
did, how could it not!
Dr. BOSWELL. I don't think it interfered with the
manner in which we did the autopsy.
Dr. HUMES. I don't either. (106)
(82) Dr. Boswell further stated that there were no
constraints. (107) Dr. Ebersole, the radiologist, likewise
informed the committee that "to the best of my knowledge there
were absolutely no restrictions and it was Dr. Humes' decision as
to the extent of the autopsy."(108) Stringer, one of the medical
photographers, also could not recall anyone issuing any orders.
(109) He stated specifically that while McHugh manifested a great
deal of emotion, he did not issue any orders. (110)
(83) This evidence indicates that:
1. Commander Humes had full authority to perform a complete
autopsy, and indeed, that Admiral Galloway told him to do
so;
2. Commander Humes, not anyone else, made any decision that
resulted in a deviation from a complete forensic autopsy;
and
3. The remarks of others to expedite the autopsy were
probably the reason for the decision to perform a less than
complete autopsy.
(84) In a committee telephone interview with Admiral
Osborne, another issue arose. He stated that he thought he
recalled seeing an intact slug roll out from the clothing of
President Kennedy and onto the autopsy table when personnel
opened the casket and removed the clothing from the body of the
President. (111)
(85) The committee reviewed thoroughly all documents and
recontacted those persons who moved the body of the President
from the casket onto the autopsy table and then prepared the body
for examination. Paul K. O'Connor, who along with James Jenkins,
had the duty of preparing the body for the autopsy, said the body
had arrived at about 8 p.m. and was wrapped in a body bag, the
head in a sheet. (112) O'Connor said he assisted in unwrapping
the sheet(113) and could not recall any foreign object,
specifically a missile, being discovered during the autopsy or
while unwrapping the sheets. (114)
(86) Jenkins likewise said he could not recall any foreign
objects being discovered or discussed and specifically could not
recall any missile or fragments of a missile falling out onto the
autopsy table or floor. (115)
(87) Throughout the committee's investigation, no one had
ever mentioned the discovery of a missile in Bethesda Naval
Hospital. The only bullet recovered was the one discovered at
Parkland Memorial Hospital.
(88) Following this investigation, the committee
recontacted Admiral Osborne and informed him that the body of the
President had not arrived in any clothes, but was wrapped in
sheets,(116) and that no one else recalled anything about the
discovery of a missile.(117) Admiral Osborne then said that he
could not be sure he actually did see a missile and that it was
possible the FBI and Secret Service only spoke about the
discovery of a missile. He did say he was positive only one
bullet was ever recovered, whether it was discovered at Bethesda
Hospital or Parkland Hospital. (118)
Post-autopsy events
(89) On Saturday morning, November 23, Dr. Humes informed
the committee that he fulfilled a religious commitment and then
met with the other two autopsy pathologists in the late morning
(119) to discuss the preparation of the autopsy report. Dr. Humes
said he then called Parkland Memorial Hospital in Dallas to speak
with the doctors who had administered emergency treatment to
President Kennedy.(120) Dr. Perry, one of the first physicians to
see and treat the President, told the committee that Dr. Humes
called him twice, separated by about a 30-minute interval. (121)
During the first call, Dr. Perry told Dr. Humes that due to the
President's failure to breathe, he had determined a tracheostomy
was necessary, then or never, and therefore made a transverse
incision straight through the bullet wound in the anterior aspect
of the neck at approximately the second or third tracheal ring.
(122) The second call involved a discussion of chest incisions
made on the President at Parkland. (123)
(90) As a result of these telephone calls, Dr. Humes
concluded that the missile which had entered the upper back had
traversed the body and exited in the anterior portion of the
neck,(124) although he had not observed the remains of any such
hole during his examination of the body.
(91) Following the telephone calls with Dr. Perry, Dr.
Humes went home and rested until late that afternoon and then
proceeded to write the autopsy protocol (autopsy report).(125) He
told the committee that after writing the report he destroyed the
original notes because they were stained with the blood of the
President and he felt it would be "inappropriate to retain [them]
to turn in to anyone in that condition" (126)
(92) In preparing the autopsy protocol, Dr. Humes did not
have access to the autopsy photographs or X-rays. (127) (This was
also the case with respect to his Warren Commission testimony.)
(93) After completion of the autopsy protocol(128). Dr.
Humes hand-carried the document to the Office of the White House
Physician at approximately 6 p.m. that evening.(129) The general
conclusions were that:
1. One missile entered in the rear of the skull of the
President and exited in the front of the skull; and
2. One missile entered the back of the President and exited
in the front of the neck. (130)
(94) The pathologists completed a supplementary report
approximately weeks later and delivered it to the White House
Physician on December 6, 1963. (131)
PART III. CONCLUSIONS
(95) The two major issues connected with the autopsy are
its scope--full versus partial--and the competency with which the
prosectors performed it. Despite allegations that the Kennedy
family or other authorities ordered a partial or limited autopsy,
evidence shows that the pathologists were given authority to
perform a complete autopsy. The autopsy was not complete,
however, according to established medicolegal standards. A
combination of strong Kennedy family desires to finish the
autopsy quickly, a military environment that hindered independent
action, a lack of experience in forensic pathology among the
prosectors, and a lack of established jurisdictional and
procedural guidelines all contributed to the pathologists'
failure to take certain measures essential to the completion of a
thorough medicolegal autopsy and to competently perform the
autopsy.
(96) The measures essential to a thorough medicolegal
autopsy that the pathologists failed to take are
1. Conducting the autopsy in an atmosphere free from the
presence of individuals not necessary to any medical or
investigative aspects of the autopsy. Aside from the
Secret Service and FBI agents, it was not necessary for
other military personnel to be in the autopsy room who
were not performing a medical function.
2. Consulting the Parkland Hospital doctors who administered
emergency treatment to the President before initiating
the autopsy. According to the medical panel of the
committee, such consultation is normal procedure.
3. Acquiring the assistance of an experienced pathologist
engaged in the full-time practice of forensic
pathology, as opposed to the consulting capacity Dr.
Finck possessed. Such experienced assistance might have
prevented several errors.
4. Recording precisely the locations of the wounds according
to anatomical landmarks routinely used in forensic
pathology. The medical panel of the committee stated
that the reference points used to document the location
of the wound in the upper back--the mastoid process and
the acromion--are movable points and should not have
been used.
5. Dissecting the wound that traversed the upper back of
the President. The medical panel stated that probing a
wound with a finger is hardly sufficient; to ascertain
the actual track, the wound must be dissected.
6. Examining all organs and documenting the results of
such examinations. Although the pathologists did
examine most organs, they made no reference to the
adrenal glands, part of the anatomy routinely examined
during the autopsy.
7. Sectioning the brain coronally. Such documentation
could have provided additional insight into the
destructive impact of the missile in the brain.
(97) The committee recognizes that the inadequacies of the
autopsy originated in part from the unique and hectic
circumstances surrounding the death of the President, and not
with any one source. Whatever the cause, however, these
inadequacies have continued to feed the confusion and mistrust so
long associated with the autopsy of President Kennedy and have
reduced the effectiveness of the committee's review of the
medical evidence. These problems reinforce the necessity for
establishing substantive and procedural guidelines to be followed
in the performance of any autopsy stemming from the assassination
of a national political official.
REFERENCES
(1) Letter from Capt. H.P. Miller, Medical Service
Corps, U.S. Navy, Director, Administrative Services, to the House
Select Committee on Assassinations, Sept. 22, 1977 (JFK Document
No. 002590).
(2) Report of the President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 53 (hereinafter "Warren
Report").
(3) Id. at p. 54.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Interview of Malcolm O. Perry, Jan. 11, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 2 (JFK Document No.
006186). See addendum I of sec. V of this volume for this
document.
(6) Testimony of Robert Nelson McClelland, Hearings
before the President's Commission on the assassination of
President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1964), vol. VI, p. 33 (hereinafter McClelland testimony,
VI Warren Commission hearings, p. 33).
(7) Testimony of William Kemp Clark, VI Warren
Commission hearings, p. 20.
( Warren Report, p. 55.
(9) The Parkland doctors were providing emergency
treatment to the President. Once the President died, their
functions ceased. Further, after the President died, they
believed it was beyond the scope of their duties to conduct any
further action. (Warren Report, pp. 55-56).
(10) Id at p. 56.
(11) Warren Report, p. 59.
(12) FBI report, Bureau No. BA 89-30, Nov. 26, 1963, p.
3 (JFK Document No. 013618) (hereinafter cited as Sibert and
O'Neill).
(13) Testimony of Dr. James J. Humes, Sept. 7, 1978,
hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S.
House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. I, p. 323ff
(hereinafter Humes testimony, Sept. 7, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings,
323ff).
(14) Id. at p. 324.
(15) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 1. See also staff interview
of James W. Sibert, Aug. 29, 1977, House Select Committee on
Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document No. 002191 ).
(16) Ibid., Sibert interview.
(17) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 1.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Warren Report, p. 59.
(21) Ibid. See also Humes testimony, II Warren
Commission hearings, p. 349. Sibert and O'Neill, p. 1.
(23) Staff interview of J. Thornton Boswell, Aug. 16,
1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK
document No. 002071).
(24) Deposition of Pierre A. Finck, Mar. 11, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 70--71 (JFK Document No.
013617).
(25) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 3.
(26) Id. at p. 2.
(27) The Sibert and O'Neill report documented that Finck
arrived after the autopsy had begun. Sibert and O'Neill, p. 2.
(28) The Sibert and O'Neill report documented that
O'Leary only remained in the autopsy room for a short time.
Sibert and O'Neill, p. 2.
(29) Staff interview of Richard A. Lipsey, Jan. 18,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No.
014469).
(30) Outside contact report, Samuel Bird, Feb. 17, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No.
005541).
(31) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 3.
(32) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 1.
(33) Ibid.
(34) Humes testimony, II Warren Commission hearings,
349.
(35) Outside contact report, James Curtiss Jenkins, June
27, 1978, Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK Document
No. 009526).
(36) Staff interview of Francis X. O'Neill, Jan. 10,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassination, p. 3 (JFK Document
006185).
(37) Ibid.
(38) See reference 15, Sibert interview, p. 5.
(39) Outside contact report, John Thomas Stringer, Aug.
17, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 13 (JFK
Document No. 003070).
(40) Staff interview of John Thomas Stringer, Aug. 17,
1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, P. 17 (JFK
Document No. 002070). See also affidavit of Dr. George C.
Burkley, Nov. 28, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations,
p. 2, in which Dr. Burkley said that the autopsy was to be a
complete autopsy, with no limitations.
(41) Outside contact report, Capt. David Osborne, June
20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document
No. 018628).
(42) Affidavit of Francis X. O'Neill, Nov. 8, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (JFK Document No.
013073). See reference 36, O'Neill interview, p. 3 (JFK Document
No. 006185). See also p. 7, O'Neill affidavit, where he stated
that he prepared this memorandum.
(43) See reference 41.
(44) Staff interview of Adm. Calvin B. Galloway, May 17,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (JFK
Document No. 009409).
(45) Humes testimony, I HSCA-JFK hearings, p. 324.
(46) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 3.
(47) See reference 40, Stringer interview.
(48) Outside contact report, Floyd Albert Riebe, Apr.
20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document
No. 007339).
(49) See reference 40, Stringer interview, p. 10.
(50) Id. at p. 11. Also blank letterhead memorandum,
Nov. 22, 1963 (JFK Document No. 002504).
(51) The original number of film exposures listed on the
receipt was in error and was changed by crossing out the typed
notation and writing in the correct number. See U.S. Secret
Service document, Dec. 5, 1963, which reflects this change.
(52) See reference 40, Stringer interview, p. 10.
(53) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 3.
(54) Deposition of James H. Ebersole, Mar. 11, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (JFK Document No.
013617).
(55) Ibid.
(56) Id. at p. 9.
(57) Ibid.
(58) Receipt from Comdr. John H. Ebersole, MC, USN,
acting chief of radiology, USNH, National Naval Medical Center,
Bethesda, Md., to Roy H. Kellerman, agent, U.S. Secret Service,
Nov. 22, 1968 (JFK Document No. 002504).
(59) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 4.
(60) Ibid., p. 3.
(61) Humes testimony, II Warren Commission hearings,
363.
(62) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 3. In their report, Sibert
and O'Neill also stated that surgery had been performed on the
head area prior to the arrival of the body at Bethesda Naval
Hospital. The committee concludes that this report was in error.
In an affidavit to the committee, Sibert acknowledged that the
statement that head surgery was performed was determined "not to
be correct following detailed inspection." See affidavit of James
Sibert, Oct. 24, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations
(JFK Document No. 012806).
(63) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 3.
(64) Autopsy protocol of President John F. Kennedy,
Naval Medical School, Bethesda, Md., autopsy No. A63-272, Nov.
22, 1963, p. 4 (hereinafter cited as autopsy protocol).
(65) Id. at p. 3.
(66) Ibid.
(67) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 3.
(68) Ibid., p. 5.
(69) See a copy of the receipt which is attached to the
affidavit of Chester H. Boyers, Dec. 4, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No. 014834).
(70) Ibid., Boyers affidavit, p. 3. See also staff
interview of Chester H. Boyers, April 25, 1978, House Select
Committee on Assassinations (JFK Documents Nos. 013614 and
014462).
(71) Ibid.
(72) Ibid.
(73) See reference 42, O'Neill affidavit, p. 5, and
reference 62, Sibert interview, p. 5. See also reference 36, p.
5; and reference 38, Sibert interview, p. 4.
(74) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 4.
(75) Autopsy protocol, p. 3.
(76) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 4.
(77) Humes testimony, II Warren Commission hearings,
363.
(78) See reference 44, p. 2.
(79) Autopsy protocol; supplemental autopsy report of
President John F. Kennedy, Dec. 6, 1963 (hereinafter cited as
supplemental autopsy report).
(80) Humes testimony, II Warren Commission hearings,
363. See also interview of Dr. James J. Humes, Aug. 17, 1977,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 7 (JFK Document No.
003070).
(81) See reference 40, Stringer interview, p. 40.
(82) Interview of Dr. George C. Burkley, Aug. 17, 1977,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (JFK Document No.
003070).
(83) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 4.
(84) See reference 62, Sibert affidavit, p. 4; and
reference 15, Sibert interview, p. 4.
(85) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 4.
(86) Ibid.
(87) Id. at p. 5.
(88) Autopsy protocol, p. 4.
(89) Deposition of John H. Ebersole, Mar. 11, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 5 (JFK Document No.
013617).
(90) Autopsy protocol, p. 4.
(91) Ibid.; Letter from Pierre A. Finck to Brig. Gen.
J.M. Blumberg, MC, USA, director, Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology, Feb. 1, 1965, p. 2.
(92) See reference 80, Humes interview, p. 7; and
Burkley interview, p. 4.
(93) Humes testimony, II Warren Commission hearings,
349.
(94) Dr. Humes emphasized in his open session testimony
before the committee that there was one and only one bullet wound
to the hack of the President's head that it entered in the rear
and that it exited in the front. Humes testimony, Sept. 7, 1978.
I HSCA JFK hearings. See also Sibert and O'Neill, p. 5.
(95) See reference 44, Galloway interview, p. 2. But see
staff interview with Richard A. Lipsey, Jan. 18, 1978, House
Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No. 014469), in
which Lipsey stated that he recalled the doctors concluding that
three missiles struck the President from behind. Lipsey said that
one bullet entered the upper back of the President and did not
exit; one entered in the rear of the head and exited the throat;
and one entered and exited in the right, top portion of the head,
causing a massive head wound.
The committee agreed that President Kennedy suffered a
wound in the upper back, a wound in the rear of the head, a
massive wound in the top right side of the head, and a wound in
the throat. Lipsey was wrong, however, in concluding that three
shots struck the President and mistaken if he believed the
pathologists reached such a conclusion. Only two shots struck the
President. One entered the upper back and exited the throat.
Another entered the rear of the head and exited on the top, right
side of the head, causing the massive defect.
Lipsey apparently formulated his conclusions based on
observations and not on the conclusions of the doctors. In this
regard, he believed the massive defect in the head represented an
entrance and exit when it was only an exit. He also concluded
that the entrance in the rear of the head corresponded to an exit
in the neck. This conclusion could not have originated with the
doctors because during the autopsy they believed the neck defect
only represented a tracheostomy incision. Lipsey did properly
relate the preliminary conclusion of the doctors during the
autopsy that the entrance wound in the upper back had no exit.
The doctors later determined that this missile had exited through
the throat. Thus, although Lipsey's recollection of the number of
defects to the body and the corresponding locations are correct,
his conclusions are wrong and are not supported by any other
evidence.
(96) Humes testimony, Sept. 7, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearing.
(97) Testimony of Roy H. Kellerman, II Warren Commission
hearings, 100.
(98) Deposition of Pierre A. Finck, Mar. 11, 1978. House
Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 110 (JFK Document No.
013617).
(99) Id. at p. 128.
(100) Id. at p. 76.
(101) Interview of James J. Humes, Sept. 16, 1977, HSCA,
p. 67 (JFK Document No. 013616), reprinted as part of Addendum I
to this report.
(102) Interview of Gen. Godfrey McHugh, May 11, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4.
(103) Ibid.
(104) Ibid.
(105) Ibid.
(106) See reference 101, Humes interview, Sept. 16,
1977, p. 66.
(107) Id. at p. 73.
(108) See reference 89, Ebersole deposition, p. 10.
(109) See reference 40, Stringer interview, p. 13.
(110) Ibid.
(111) See reference 41.
(112) Outside contact report, Paul K. O'Connor, June 28,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No.
013613).
(113) Ibid.
(114) Ibid.
(115) See reference 35.
(116) Sibert and O'Neill, p. 3; see reference 112; see
also reference 35.
(117) See reference 41.
(118) Ibid.
(119) See reference 101, Humes interview, Sept. 16, 1977
p. 49.
(120) Ibid.
(121) Interview of Dr. Malcolm Perry, Jan. 11, 1978,
House Select Committee on Assassinations, 9.8 (JFK Document No.
006370).
(122) Id. at p. 2.
(123) Id. at p. 8.
(124) Autopsy protocol, p. 6.
(125) See reference 101, Humes interview, Sept. 16, 1977
p. 51.
(126) Ibid. See also Humes testimony, Sept. 7, 1978 I
HSCA-JFK hearings. p. 330.
(127) Ibid., Humes testimony, p. 331.
(128) Admiral Galloway instructed Elsie B. Closson, his
secretary, to type the autopsy report and the supplemental report
because he believed he needed a typist with a top secret security
clearance. See outside contact report, Elsie B. Closson, May 4,
1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK Document No.
008135 ).
(129) See reference 101, Humes Interview, Sept. 16,
1977, p. 22.
(130) Autopsy protocol, p. 16.
(131) Supplemental autopsy report.