For starters, there is Drain's revelation that the Fingerprint Specialists at the FBI thought it was faked.
Please cite your source. Here is Drain’s account as he told it in “No More Silence” by Larry Sneed, page 259:
Over the years allegations have been made about the way the FBI and the Dallas Police Department handled the affair. In one of the books, I was quoted in a footnote as saying that I doubted that a fingerprint had been found on the rifle as claimed by the Dallas Police Department. As I recall, I think my comment was based primarily on our experts in the Single Fingerprint Bureau. That’s the real specialists in fingerprints in the FBI in Washington. From the time they turned the rifle over to me along with other things, they were placed in a box and sealed. I then took it to the laboratory where it was taken apart and examined with different processes on every inch of that gun, assembled and disassembled. They said that they didn’t find any fingerprints. Now, I wouldn’t have any way of knowing from my own personal observation. My comment would have been made on what they said. As to Lieutenant Day, I’ve known him a long time, and I think that he’s an honest individual. If he thought that there was a print there, whether there was or not, he was sincere in what he had to say. I would not want to cast any reflection on Day.
I highlighted the relevant phrases. Nothing there about anyone thinking that anyone forged anything. This is simply a case of asking the question as to why they didn’t find any fingerprints. And their questions being answered satisfactorily to the ones asking them. Yet you are apparently trying to spin it into something that it never was.
And, of course, there are the various issues that raised the serious question in the minds of the Commission regarding the authenticity of the palmprint. Issues that were so troublesome a further investigation was ordered to get to the bottom of things.
It appears to me that this was simply one of 51 questions brought up by one of the historians during the final push in reviewing and editing the report. Here is what is written in Howard Willens’ book “History Will Prove Us Right”, page 344:
Goldberg’s review of this draft chapter included general comments and fifty-one specific observations or questions. He wanted to put the discussion of Oswald’s movements after leaving the depository ahead of the section dealing with Tippit’s murder, which was implemented in subsequent drafts. He pointed out the need for more precision and clarity in the discussion of the critical evidence identifying Oswald as the assassin of Kennedy and the killer of Tippit—for example, the palm print on the rifle, the various descriptions of the suspect before the Tippit shooting, Oswald’s taking the rifle to the depository, the exact time of the Tippit shooting, and the eyewitness testimony regarding this event. These, too, were passed on to Redlich.35
I see nothing about any “serious questions in the minds of the commission”. Just some easily answered clarifications being requested.
You might want to consider broadening your reading list to include both sides of the argument. If you approach things with an open mind, you might begin to see things in a different light. Just a friendly suggestion…
Please cite your source.Drain's claims are cited in full in the OP.
It appears to me that this was simply one of 51 questions brought up by one of the historians during the final push in reviewing and editing the report.Wrong.
"Dated August 28th, 1964, less than one month from the release of the Warren Report, the internal FBI memo stated: "[Warren Commission General Counsel] Rankin advised
because of the circumstances that now exist there was a serious question in the minds of the Commission as to whether or not the palm impression that has been obtained from the Dallas Police Department is a legitimate latent palm impression removed from the barrel or whether it was obtained from some other source and that for this reason the matter needs to be resolved."
There was the report in July stating there was no palmprint on the rifle.
In Liebler's HSCA testimony we find that he and Redlich had a serious argument over the palmprint issue with Redlich not wanting to look into it any further but Liebler insisting the issue was resolved. After a discussion with Rankin it was decided to ask the FBI to further investigate the issue.
HSCA Exhibit #34 is a memo sent from Liebler to Rankin on 28th August outlining these issues:
To : J. Lee Rankin.
From : Wesley J. Liebeler.
Messrs . Griffin and Slawson and I raise questions covering the palmprint which Lt. Day of the Dallas Police Department testified he lifted from the underside of the barrel of the K-1 rifle on November 22, 1963. That story is set forth on pages 7-10 of the proposed final draft of Chapter IV of the Report, copies of which are attached .
We suggest that additional investigation be conducted to determine with greater certainty that the palmprint was actually lifted from the rifle as Lt. Day has testified . The only evidence we presently have on that print is the testimony of Lt. Day himself. He has stated that although he lifted the palmprint on November 22, 1963, he did not provide a copy of the lift to the FBI until November 26, 1963 (9 R 260-61) . He also testified that after the lift he "could still see traces of the print under the barrel and was going to try to use photography to bring off or bring out a better print." Mr. Latona of the FBI testified with respect to the lift of the palmprint, that "evidently the lifting had been so complete that there was nothing left to show any marking on the gun itself as to the existence of such even an attempt on the part of anyone else to process the rifle" (Id. at 24) .
Additional problems are raised by the fact that
(1) Mr. Latona testified that the poor finish of the K-1 rifle made it absorbent and not conducive to getting a good print ;
(2) None of the other prints on the rifle could be identified because they were of such poor quality ;
(3) The other prints on the rifle were protected by cellophane while the area where the palmprint had been lifted was not, even though Lt. Day testified that after the lift the "([palm] print on gun was their best bet, still remained on there," when he was asked why he had not released the lift to the FBI on November 22, 1963
We should review the above circumstances at our conference with Agent Latona and Inspector Malley. The configuration of the palmprint should be reviewed to determine, if possible, whether or not it was removed from a cylindrical surface. The possibility that the palmprint or evidence of the lift was destroyed while the rifle was in transit should be reviewed with them. The exact condition of the rifle at the time It was turned over to the FBI Dallas office should be ascertained. Agent Latona should be asked if he can think of any explanation for the apparent conflict in the above testimony .
We should also
(1) Determine whether or not Lt. Day had assistance when he worked with the prints on the rifle . If he did, we should obtain statements from those who assisted him.
(2) Lt. Day should be asked why he preserved the fingerprints on the rifle, which were sufficiently clear to make positive identification, and yet did not preserve the palmprint, which was clear enough for that purpose.
(3) Lt. Day should also be asked why he removed only the palmprint and should be requestioned covering his recollection that he saw the palmprint still on the rifle after he made the lift .
(4) Lt. Day should be asked if he took any photographs of the palmprint on the rifle after the lift . He may have done so, since he did photograph the less valuable fingerprints, and the palmprint on the rifle, according to his testimony, was still the "best bet" for identification . It is also significant that Lt. Day stated that he was going to attempt to get a better print through use of photography
They needed "to determine with greater certainty that the palmprint was actually lifted from the rifle as Lt. Day has testified."
It appears it is
you who needs to broaden their reading list.
You also side-stepped the main criticism of your post:
"Do you not feel weird suggesting that no-one at the DPD thought it was very urgent that a legible palmprint had been lifted from the murder weapon and could be compared with at least three sets of palmprints taken from their prime suspect who they had in custody.
The eyes of the world were on the DPD. They were under instant and immense pressure to solve this case and you're saying they didn't think matching the print lifted from the murder weapon to prints taken from their main suspect was "terribly urgent".
Do you really believe this?
In my last post I raised the issue of Day's report in which he stated that he couldn't make the identification of the palmprint because he had to give the rifle to the FBI.
Do you also believe this?