Kennedy vs the CIA

[Brian Walker]

It was for political reasons, Brian. There was a Presidential election coming up and he was playing to the crowd.... appearing to act tough.

That is your theory but that really makes no sense. It would be political suicide to tell the world what a disaster it would be to lose Vietnam and then pull out and lose Vietnam. There was no need for him to make those claims.

He was firm believer in the domino theory and it was not going to be easy for him to pull out and lose Vietnam. 

[Ray Mitcham]

He was firm believer in the domino theory and it was not going to be easy for him to pull out and lose Vietnam.

That is your theory. He changed whilst he was in the White House. He was going to bring Castro back into the fold, until the powers that be decided he had to go.

They wanted their war and by the assassination they got it.

[Matt Grantham]

That is your theory. He changed whilst he was in the White House. He was going to bring Castro back into the fold, until the powers that be decided he had to go.

They wanted their war and by the assassination they got it.

No doubt there was huge change after the Cuban missile crisis American University, Norman Cousins, it's all there There is even the rumor that Mary Pichot Meyers turned him and RFK to LSD during this period

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/19/mary-pinchot-meyer-jfk-mistress-assassinated_n_1434191.html

[Brian Walker]

That is your theory. He changed whilst he was in the White House. He was going to bring Castro back into the fold, until the powers that be decided he had to go.

They wanted their war and by the assassination they got it.

It is not my theory that he believed in the domino theory. He said so point blank for all to hear.  He changed so much that in his undelivered Trademart speech he said flat out that a Commies breakthrough in Vietnam it might force the US to use troops in there. But let me guess just tough talk.

You guys always do this.

[Gary Craig]

http://www.jfk-info.com/files.htm

THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON TRANSITION:
THE CASE FOR POLICY REVERSAL
 by DR. JOHN M. NEWMAN.

~snip~

Combat Troops:   Just Another Notch or a Fork in the Road?

   "What was American policy in Vietnam in the early 1960s?  From early in his administration,

President Kennedy accepted that the primary American objective was to prevent the communist

domination of South Vietnam.  There was never any argument over the ends of American Vietnam policy

under Kennedy, but there was an argument over the means to be employed to achieve those ends.  More

specifically, President Kennedy's policy was to assist the South Vietnamese to prevent the communist

domination of their country.  The prohibition against engaging in another American land war in

Asia was a fundamental policy of the Kennedy Administration, and one which President Johnson actually

endorsed in 1964.

   To deny that the decision to send in ground combat units did not reverse this long-standing feature

of American Vietnam policy simply ignores the most basic facts.  A popular proposition used by observers

who dispute that the use of combat troops reversed US policy is the "gradual slide" argument, which holds

that, on a so-called "policy continuum", ground combat units simply represent the next rung on the ladder

of escalation.  In other words, when the marines waded ashore it was as if the mercury in the

thermometer went from 72 to 73 degrees.  Under Kennedy the temperature increased so

many degrees and under Johnson it increased so many degrees and, since both were in the same

direction, Johnson simply continued the policy.

   Such arguments blur the crucial distinction between a policy of advising the South Vietnamese army

how to fight the war and a policy using the American army to fight the war.  From any perspective, not the

least of which was the Viet Cong's, the difference between the South Vietnamese army and the American

army was not subtle, and neither was the difference between the Special Forces, on the one hand, and the

Marines or 82D  Airborne Division, on the other.  These differences are fundamental, and to construe a

large increase in advisors as something only slightly less or a little different than brigades and divisions of

ground forces is just nonsense.   

   Presidents Kennedy and Johnson could have further deepened American commitments and ratcheted

up American participation in the war effort without crossing the Rubicon of conventional forces in Vietnam. 

Sending in the American army was nothing less than taking a different turn at the main fork in the

road to Vietnam.  There are those who argue that the Kennedy Administration never faced this fork in

the road, and that the dire situation faced by Johnson only developed after Kennedy's unfortunate demise. 

This argument is misinformed, as the record of Kennedy's first year in office makes unequivocally

clear."
 
        1961:  NSAM-111 and the Limits to American Involvement 

   "What does the record of the Kennedy Administration's first year reveal about Vietnam policy? 

What was the situation?  What was the President told and how were the policy choices framed?  What

policy did Kennedy choose?

   The political and military situation in Vietnam was already critical and deteriorating further by the

time Kennedy was inaugurated in January 1961. For the first three months the worsening situation in

Vietnam was overshadowed by the crisis in Laos, but over the summer and fall of 1961 Vietnam became

the focus of American attention in Indochina.  As the military situation became increasingly critical, calls

within the Administration for the use of American combat forces in Vietnam prompted a major debate over

Vietnam policy in October-November 1961, a debate Kennedy finally resolved with one of his most

important decisions on Vietnam: National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)-111, promulgated on

November 22, 1961.

   The President sent his top experts to Vietnam for a look while the concerned departments and

intelligence agencies in Washington studied the situation anew.  All of this activity produced a veritable

slew of proposals about what to do, and although there were differences between many of them, most all

advocated sending American combat troops to Vietnam.  The argument that Kennedy was never

confronted with the situation that Johnson was, that Kennedy did not face the sort of difficult choices that

Johnson later did, is an argument which ignores the heart of the Kennedy record on this matter.

   Kennedy was told in no uncertain terms that the military situation in Vietnam was critical and that

the fate of South Vietnam hung in the balance.  Moreover, Kennedy's advisors framed the issue this way:

that the loss of South Vietnam to the communists would affect vital US interests regionally and globally,

and that the only way to prevent such an outcome was to send in American ground forces.4   The

President was told that nothing short of several American combat divisions could save South Vietnam.  It

was in that dire context and against those forceful arguments that Kennedy said no to American combat

forces in Vietnam.  The record on this permits no argument and no wiggle room.  Kennedy was

irreconcilably opposed to an American ground war in Vietnam.

   Instead of combat troops, Kennedy agreed to a substantial increase in American advisors.  This

decision was implemented under the provisions of NSAM-111.  Those observers who cite this decision as

evidence that Kennedy pushed a reluctant military into Vietnam obviously haven't a clue about the context

in which this decision was made.  When the situation, the recommendations and Kennedy's decision are

looked at as a whole, they boil down to this:  even when Kennedy was told the only workable solution

was conventional American forces, he would only agree to assisting the South Vietnamese army fight their

war."

~snip~ 

[Barry Pollard]

...

"[Diem] and his brother were again and consistantly asking the US to leave."----sorry, but you're going to have to source that one. I think the Ngo brothers tried to scare the US that once, but no one took it seriously. If Averell Harriman had little use for Diem, Ho Chi Minh had even less. And without US support, Diem wouldn't be able to stand for long against a North Vietnam that was increasingly well supported both Moscow.

Hi Mitch,
you'll have to wait for that source I'm afraid(not a great note taker here) but it's from the records, probably the PP, if I come across who referenced it I'll post it.
If I had to guess, it's a report from someone in the field that someone else, perhaps Harriman himself, showed to JFK, (repeated and consistant calls for the US to leave and talk of negotating with the north).

Just a general opinion on other matters brought up...
There's two domino theories, the other is pure economics and works just as well.
The withdrawal, okay, I take away my left hand but build up my right with steroids, then wear a glove with studs on it and keep bashing you in the face but look, I've withdrawn my left... concentrate on that.
We were leaving them the planes, the choppers, the bombs, the guns, the ammo, the techs and all in the hands of a government run by people fully commited to winning which we will implement before we "leave"(in 1965).
"Ciao, missing you already".

Bring the boys back home and no one cares what goes on over there without them.

Macnamara, who would ever claim this guy was a dummy?
But here's what happens, all these years he thought he was doing the right thing, protecting democracy in a far off land, what a guy!
Around 1995 he's invited to talk with his former enemies, turns up, has the talk and almost gets into a fist fight after they claim, they never were communists and had been fighting the Chinese for thousands of years. Tick Tock, tick tock, plonk! After a while the penny finally drops. He was wrong, they were fighting for independance.
Now here's the rub, when he get's back home the first thing he does is say the complete opposite to what he's just learnt. He's as thick as they come.
Don't ask me for sources but watch "The Fog of War" and the films, speeches and interviews about his 1990s talks with the north, all online.
It's actually worse than that, how could someone in his position not know what this was all about, the man who commisioned the PP, how could he still not know in the 1990s?
They looked into who was influencing the north long before, they found nothing.

[Barry Pollard]

...
   Instead of combat troops, Kennedy agreed to a substantial increase in American advisors.  This

decision was implemented under the provisions of NSAM-111.  Those observers who cite this decision as

evidence that Kennedy pushed a reluctant military into Vietnam obviously haven't a clue about the context

in which this decision was made.  When the situation, the recommendations and Kennedy's decision are

looked at as a whole, they boil down to this:  even when Kennedy was told the only workable solution

was conventional American forces, he would only agree to assisting the South Vietnamese army fight their

war."

~snip~

Quick sketch of an average fighter for the southern army; he's forced into service, refusal isn't an option, everyone of his "enemies" is potentially a family member who had to flee because of political beliefs, or a cousin, a friend or a neighbor, so every time he's not being watched he's shooting over their heads and if by chance his commander gets shot, they stop shooting and invite the other side across for a chat and some tea. Good luck winning that "war".

Now here's my question regarding Newman and the above(I haven't read it), does he really believe they were just advisors(does anyone?), does he deal with the reality or not and does he go into the report that NSAM-111 originated from?  I'll have to refresh my memory to why but the report/study in the second question has it's own controversy.
Biased, trumped up, one sided, something along those lines.

[Barry Pollard]

IF STONES analysis of the International Control Commision's report which both Kennedy and Johnson used to invade South Vietnam.
Ignore the bold text at the top and elsewhere and it's easier to follow.

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:u_hAXHDJEc4J:http://www.ifstone.org/weekly/IFStonesWeekly-1965mar08.pdf%2Bif+stone's+weekly+volume+xiii+no9&hl=en-GB&gbv=2&ct=clnk

Most foreign made weapons captured from the NFL were from the communist block, that amounts to about 2.5% of the total, where did the other 97.5% come from? The USA of course but just ignore the second part and you're okay.
Also ignore how the US itself violated the Geneva accords on numerous occasions and even stopped the ICC itself from fully checking their own stockpiles of arms and again, you're good to go.

This is what NSAM-111 is based on, a completely one sided view of that same report.
Ring any bells from the not too distant past?


Want to know why the Vietnam domino theory has it's roots in Japan's economy(the super domino)?
Type Japan into the small box in the following link and hit "search inside", then click on each hit in turn and read the text.
Dulles and the CIA were searching for an area to help secure Japan's economic future, since it's trade with China would no longer be an option.
https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/A_Preponderance_of_Power.html?id=pIIeG_yn72wC&redir_esc=y

April 1954, Eisenhower's press conference, scroll down to the Q. from Robert Richard's and read the full A.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10202