JFK Assassination Forum
JFK Assassination Plus General Discussion & Debate => JFK Assassination Plus General Discussion And Debate => Topic started by: Gerry Down on March 11, 2021, 11:44:11 PM
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JFK biographer Mr. Reeves says JFK caused the Vietnam war by authorizing the overthrow of Diem which occurred on Nov 1st 1963. 29-35 minutes on the below video:
This goes very much against the narrative James Douglas portrays in his book JFK And The Unspeakable in which he portrays JFK as a peace-loving hippie.
I wonder if JFK thought he could settle things in Vietnam using the overthrow in order to prevent Vietnam becoming an issue at the 1964 election. If so it was a very selfish thing to do as alot of people got killed in that war. Not of course did he intend that to happen, but he may have started the whole thing just to try and help him win the 1964 election.
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JFK biographer Mr. Reeves says JFK caused the Vietnam war by authorizing the overthrow of Diem which occurred on Nov 1st 1963. 29-35 minutes on the below video:
This goes very much against the narrative James Douglas portrays in his book JFK And The Unspeakable in which he portrays JFK as a peace-loving hippie.
I wonder if JFK thought he could settle things in Vietnam using the overthrow in order to prevent Vietnam becoming an issue at the 1964 election. If so it was a very selfish thing to do as alot of people got killed in that war. Not of course did he intend that to happen, but he may have started the whole thing just to try and help him win the 1964 election.
It seems to me that JFK's support for the removal of Diem (and his brother) undercuts the allegation that he had decided by November to leave Vietnam, to withdraw US forces. If he made that decision then why deepen US involvement by supporting a coup? What was the purpose of a coup if the plan was to leave? As Reeves argues, supporting the Diem removal is akin to Colin Powell's observation about Iraq - "If you break it, you own it." If you remove the government, if you essentially "break it", then you have an obligation to put one back together. Or try to. Which is what LBJ tried to do afterwards.
Furthermore, if JFK had not made a decision to leave at that time then the argument that he was assassinated by "them" - the CIA, the Pentagon, the "National Security State" - because he was going to leave is completely undermined. He's not made a decision to leave so there's no reason to murder him because he was going "soft on communism". Maybe at a later date he was; but on November 22, 1963 he had not made that decision.
Robert Kennedy pointed out in 1964 the problem they faced with Diem and the aftermath of his removal, a problem that LBJ inherited:
"[T]he situation began to deteriorate in the spring of 1962, uh, spring of 1963. I think David Halberstam, from the New York Times' articles, had a strong effect on molding public opinion: the fact that the situation was unsatisfactory. Our problem was that thinking of Halberstam sort of as the Ma-- what Matthews [NY Times reporter Herbert Matthews] did in Cuba, that Batista [Fulgencio R. Batista] was not very satisfactory, but the important thing was to try to get somebody who could replace him and somebody who could keep, continue the war and keep the country united, and that was far more difficult. So that was what was of great concern to all of us during this period of time. Nobody liked Diem particularly, but how to get rid of him and get somebody that would continue the war, not split the country in two, and therefore lose not only the war but the country. That was the great problem.
Again, the key sentence: "...the important thing was to try to get somebody who could replace him and somebody who could keep, continue the war and keep the country united, and that was far more difficult. So that was what was of great concern to all of us during this period of time."
The Administration plan was to "try to get somebody who could replace him." That's not something you're going to do, it seems to me, if the decision was made to leave. Here RFK is admitting that the plan - at that time - was to try to "keep the country united" in a post-Diem regime. And the US would be staying there to do just that.
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Supporting RFK's views above, the Pentagon Papers, the historical account of US involvement in Vietnam that was ordered by McNamara, has this key passage on the question of Diem's removal:
This is from the section titled "Evolution of the War":
"In the course of these policy debates [i.e., how to deal with Diem], several participants pursued the logical but painful conclusion that if the war could not be won with Diem, and if his removal would lead to political chaos and also jeopardize the war effort, then the war was probably unwinnable. If that were the case, the argument went, then the U.S. should really be facing a more basic decision of either an orderly disengagement from an irretrievable situation, or a major escalation of the U.S. involvement, including the use of U.S. combat troops."
It continues: "These prophetic minority voices were, however, raising an unpleasant prospect that the [Kennedy] Administration was unprepared to face at that time. In hindsight, however, it is clear that this was one of the times in the history of our Vietnam involvement when we were making fundamental choices. The option to disengage honorably at that time now appears an attractively low-cost one. But for the Kennedy Administration the costs no doubt appeared much higher. In any event, it proved to be unwilling to accept the implications of predictions for a bleak future. The Administration hewed to the belief that if the US be but willing to exercise its power, it could ultimately have its way in world affairs."
For emphasis: "The Administration hewed to the belief that if the US be but willing to exercise its power, it could ultimately have its way in world affairs."
Link here: ttps://nara-media-001.s3.amazonaws.com/arcmedia/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-IV-B-5.pdf
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JFK biographer Mr. Reeves says JFK caused the Vietnam war by authorizing the overthrow of Diem which occurred on Nov 1st 1963. 29-35 minutes on the below video:
This goes very much against the narrative James Douglas portrays in his book JFK And The Unspeakable in which he portrays JFK as a peace-loving hippie.
I wonder if JFK thought he could settle things in Vietnam using the overthrow in order to prevent Vietnam becoming an issue at the 1964 election. If so it was a very selfish thing to do as alot of people got killed in that war. Not of course did he intend that to happen, but he may have started the whole thing just to try and help him win the 1964 election.
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JFK biographer Mr. Reeves says JFK caused the Vietnam war by authorizing the overthrow of Diem which occurred on Nov 1st 1963. 29-35 minutes on the below video:
This goes very much against the narrative James Douglas portrays in his book JFK And The Unspeakable in which he portrays JFK as a peace-loving hippie.
I wonder if JFK thought he could settle things in Vietnam using the overthrow in order to prevent Vietnam becoming an issue at the 1964 election. If so it was a very selfish thing to do as alot of people got killed in that war. Not of course did he intend that to happen, but he may have started the whole thing just to try and help him win the 1964 election.
The argument made by CT that JFK was pulling out of Vietnam is all you need to know about their arguments. They cherry pick to try and back that narrative. No good argument can be made that JFK was about to pull out of Vietnam until the communists were defeated.
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The argument made by CT that JFK was pulling out of Vietnam is all you need to know about their arguments. They cherry pick to try and back that narrative. No good argument can be made that JFK was about to pull out of Vietnam until the communists were defeated.
Or until the South could defend itself with us helping (they provide the troops, we provide the training and weapons) - which was the goal; or until it was determined to be a hopeless war. But as RFK said and the Pentagon Papers show, in November of '63 it looked "difficult" but still winnable. There was no need - at that time - to pull out.
Why would JFK simply decide to leave when the outcome was unknown? And why support Diem's removal if you are going to leave? RFK again pointed out the thinking: we remove Diem and get a capable government and it's winnable. Difficult but winnable.
Moreover, JFK's public rhetoric limited his actions. He repeatedly stated a defense of the South was in US national interest. That a loss would lead to the "dominoes" falling throughout the region. And that Mao's China - who they thought was behind the North's actions - would benefit. All of this made, JFK pointed out, the defense of Saigon necessary for the US.
There's nothing to indicate for me - not in McNamara's biography or Rusk's or Bundy's or the Pentagon Papers - that this was just public relations rhetoric to fight off the charge of "Who Lost China" with Vietnam being the replacement for China. His top advisers said there was no discussion at that time of leaving.
The conspiracists can still argue - John Newman does - that the conspirators killed JFK because they THOUGHT he was going to leave. They admit that JFK had not yet made that decision but given his actions in Laos and Cuba, where he refused to send in troops, that the assassins concluded that he was going to at some point. And it was for this that they assassinated him.
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From the domino theory to the domino room?
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From the domino theory to the domino room?
If we truly live in a computer simulation then somebody's messing with us.
I always wondered (not really but let's go with it) that the people running this simulation left for a while and their two six year old boys got control of things. And they're doing what six year olds tend to do if not supervised. What else explains this craziness going on? At least here in the US.
Recall that line by King Lear?: "As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods. They kill us for their sport."
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It seems to me that JFK's support for the removal of Diem (and his brother) undercuts the allegation that he had decided by November to leave Vietnam, to withdraw US forces. If he made that decision then why deepen US involvement by supporting a coup? What was the purpose of a coup if the plan was to leave? As Reeves argues, supporting the Diem removal is akin to Colin Powell's observation about Iraq - "If you break it, you own it." If you remove the government, if you essentially "break it", then you have an obligation to put one back together. Or try to. Which is what LBJ tried to do afterwards.
Yes. The CT narrative does not make sense. Kennedy decides we have to give up on South Vietnam. That he needs to get all the troops out of there. But before he does that, he decides to support a coup. That makes no sense. If he thinks South Vietnam is doomed anyway, what’s the point of the coup? And when South Vietnam does fall, people will blame Kennedy saying it wouldn’t have happened but for the coup.
What does the coup buy him if he thinks we should get out of South Vietnam?
It seems to me that this whole narrative is just to support a notion that Moscow would fully support. That we have not lived in a true Democracy for almost 60 years. That just like Russia, the America is governed by a group that has never been elected.
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Blame it on Woodrow Wilson.
Wilson ignores petition by Ho Chi Minh for help in creating Vietnam independent from French rule and led by nationalist government.
Roosevelt declines repeated requests from the French to assist France's attempts to recolonize Vietnam.
To hell with the French.
Following the outbreak of the Korean War, Truman announces "acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina...". and sends 123 non-combat troops to help with supplies to fight against the communist Viet Minh.
Postponing the inevitable.
1951 — Truman authorizes $150 million in French support.
Shoulda listened to FDR.
November 1, 1955 — President Eisenhower deploys the Military Assistance Advisory Group to train the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. This marks the official beginning of American involvement in the war as recognized by the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.
Shoulda listened to FDR.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_in_the_Vietnam_War
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Where are the contrarians to jump in and tell us that any answer that they don't like is merely speculation? Of course the answer to what might have happened had JFK not been assassinated is speculation. What we do know is that JFK was susceptible to the same political pressures as LBJ to appear tough on Communism. Perhaps as a second term President without the concerns for running for reelection in 1968, JFK may have not acted in exactly the same way as LBJ. But it is difficult to envision JFK allowing S. Vietnam to be overrun by Commies on his watch. So it's likely that the US would have maintained a military presence in S. Vietnam through the end of JFK's presidency and the next president (whether Nixon or LBJ) would have continued that process until it became completely untenable (i.e. after the loss of life and many years of war). It simply was not a feasible political option for any President in the 1960s to abandon S. Vietnam.
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So it's likely that the US would have maintained a military presence in S. Vietnam through the end of JFK's presidency and the next president (whether Nixon or LBJ) would have continued that process until it became completely untenable (i.e. after the loss of life and many years of war).
The next president could have been RFK. He would have been stuck with the problem.
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Where are the contrarians to jump in and tell us that any answer that they don't like is merely speculation?
Alot of people might not be familiar with the Vietnam war and how the US got into it. I'm one of these people.
What are the most authoritative books on the Vietnam war (specifically on how we got into it)? I know of John Newmans JFK and Vietnam. What others are there (non JFK assassination related)?
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Alot of people might not be familiar with the Vietnam war and how the US got into it. I'm one of these people.
What are the most authoritative books on the Vietnam war (specifically on how we got into it)? I know of John Newmans JFK and Vietnam. What others are there (non JFK assassination related)?
Stanley Karnow's history: https://www.amazon.com/Vietnam-History-Stanley-Karnow/dp/0140265473/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=stanley+karnow&qid=1615827214&s=books&sr=1-1
And his other works: https://www.amazon.com/Stanley-Karnow/e/B000AQ0432/ref=dp_byline_cont_pop_book_1
He was on the ground reporting at the time of the first American soldier being killed until the very end. The entire time. As he admits though, he didn't have access to North Vietnamese archives or many sources. So he was limited in presenting "their side" of things. But that's true of every historian on the conflict.
One of the key points in this question of what JFK was going to do was that Khrushchev was removed from power in 1964. He had urged Hanoi to stop fighting and negotiate some sort of agreement. But his replacements - Brezhnev most notably - changed that policy and gave full support to the North. JFK would have to have faced that change.
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Stanley Karnow's history: https://www.amazon.com/Vietnam-History-Stanley-Karnow/dp/0140265473/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=stanley+karnow&qid=1615827214&s=books&sr=1-1
And his other works: https://www.amazon.com/Stanley-Karnow/e/B000AQ0432/ref=dp_byline_cont_pop_book_1
He was on the ground reporting at the time of the first American soldier being killed until the very end. The entire time. As he admits though, he didn't have access to North Vietnamese archives or many sources. So he was limited in presenting "their side" of things. But that's true of every historian on the conflict.
Thanks.
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Thanks.
And the Pentagon Papers (free) here: https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers
That's a history of US involvement up through 1967 1968. But it has great sections - very detailed - on the Kennedy's Administrations policies. What comes out at you reading the papers is how much the US thought China was behind the North's aggression. They really saw it as an attempt by Beijing to take over SE Asia.
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JFK was pragmatic enough to realize that if communism couldn't have been stopped on an island some 90 miles from Miami...how could it be stopped 12,000 miles away?
Kennedy had military experience observing the logistics of an overseas war. Bush 41 also.
Now, the US military is being turned into some kind of social experiment. A conventional war just might mean its demise.
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2021/03/15/senator-demands-meeting-with-defense-leaders-over-their-response-to-criticism-of-women-in-the-ranks/
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Quite a few years ago I read the book “JFK and Vietnam” by John M. Newman. I don’t remember all of the details but in the book Newman makes a good argument for his ideas. And, if I remember correctly, he shows how the Diem coup support was based on a very hastily made decision which was based upon incomplete information.
Here are a couple of reviews from Amazon:
Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Had he lived, would President Kennedy have committed U.S. troops to Vietnam? According to the evidence marshalled here, the answer is a resounding no. Newman, who teaches international politics at the University of Maryland, argues that when JFK went to Dallas he already intended to withdraw U.S. advisers from Vietnam, but held off to ensure his reelection in 1964. The book traces the president's pullout plan back to April '62, when he stated that the U.S. should seize every opportunity to reduce its commitment to Vietnam. A month later Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara asked U.S. generals in Saigon how soon the South Vietnamese would be ready to take over the war effort. This well-documented study shows that JFK was for a time deceived by Gen. Maxwell Taylor, head of the joint chiefs, and others in a blizzard of briefings that claimed unadulterated progress and success. Newman maintains that although the president paid public lip service to a continued commitment to appease the right, his goal was to abandon a venture that he early recognized as a lost cause. No other study has revealed so clearly how the tragedy in Dallas affected the course of the war in Vietnam, since two days after the assassination Lyndon Johnson signed a National Security Action Memo that opened the way for the fateful escalation of the war. Photos.
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.
From Kirkus Reviews
Bold and authoritative revisionist analysis of Kennedy's Vietnam policy, by a US Army major who teaches history at the Univ. of Maryland. What was JFK's real agenda regarding Vietnam? Newman claims that the young President planned to withdraw American forces from that war-torn country--and his case is strong. The author pictures an isolated Kennedy battling both cold war jingoism and a military- industrial lobby avid for a war that would make tens of billions of dollars. Conventional wisdom generally sees JFK's early attacks on Eisenhower's covert liaison with France regarding Vietnam as simple political expediency, and Kennedy as another adherent to the domino theory. JFK's speeches buttress that position, but Newman, working with newly declassified material, argues that these speeches were simply requisite political twistings and turnings--and that Kennedy planned to get the US out of Vietnam despite a hawkish palace clique (led by Lyndon Johnson) that fed him disinformation on this most crucial foreign-policy issue. Document by document, incident by incident, the author reveals Kennedy as stranded within his own Administration, alienated by his desire to avoid this ultimate wrong-time, wrong-place war. Newman's research culminates in two crucial National Security Action Memos. In one, authored several weeks before Kennedy's death, the President formally endorsed withdrawal from Vietnam of a thousand advisors by the end of 1963 (to be followed by complete withdrawal by the end of 1965). In the second, written six days after the assassination, LBJ reversed the withdrawal policy and planned in some detail the escalation to follow. Crucial to any reevaluation of JFK as President and statesman, this electrifying report portrays a wily, stubborn, conflicted leader who grasped realities that eluded virtually everyone else in the US establishment. -- Copyright ©1992, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.
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Quite a few years ago I read the book “JFK and Vietnam” by John M. Newman. I don’t remember all of the details but in the book Newman makes a good argument for his ideas. And, if I remember correctly, he shows how the Diem coup support was based on a very hastily made decision which was based upon incomplete information.
Here are a couple of reviews from Amazon:
Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Had he lived, would President Kennedy have committed U.S. troops to Vietnam? According to the evidence marshalled here, the answer is a resounding no. Newman, who teaches international politics at the University of Maryland, argues that when JFK went to Dallas he already intended to withdraw U.S. advisers from Vietnam, but held off to ensure his reelection in 1964. The book traces the president's pullout plan back to April '62, when he stated that the U.S. should seize every opportunity to reduce its commitment to Vietnam. A month later Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara asked U.S. generals in Saigon how soon the South Vietnamese would be ready to take over the war effort. This well-documented study shows that JFK was for a time deceived by Gen. Maxwell Taylor, head of the joint chiefs, and others in a blizzard of briefings that claimed unadulterated progress and success. Newman maintains that although the president paid public lip service to a continued commitment to appease the right, his goal was to abandon a venture that he early recognized as a lost cause. No other study has revealed so clearly how the tragedy in Dallas affected the course of the war in Vietnam, since two days after the assassination Lyndon Johnson signed a National Security Action Memo that opened the way for the fateful escalation of the war. Photos.
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.
From Kirkus Reviews
Bold and authoritative revisionist analysis of Kennedy's Vietnam policy, by a US Army major who teaches history at the Univ. of Maryland. What was JFK's real agenda regarding Vietnam? Newman claims that the young President planned to withdraw American forces from that war-torn country--and his case is strong. The author pictures an isolated Kennedy battling both cold war jingoism and a military- industrial lobby avid for a war that would make tens of billions of dollars. Conventional wisdom generally sees JFK's early attacks on Eisenhower's covert liaison with France regarding Vietnam as simple political expediency, and Kennedy as another adherent to the domino theory. JFK's speeches buttress that position, but Newman, working with newly declassified material, argues that these speeches were simply requisite political twistings and turnings--and that Kennedy planned to get the US out of Vietnam despite a hawkish palace clique (led by Lyndon Johnson) that fed him disinformation on this most crucial foreign-policy issue. Document by document, incident by incident, the author reveals Kennedy as stranded within his own Administration, alienated by his desire to avoid this ultimate wrong-time, wrong-place war. Newman's research culminates in two crucial National Security Action Memos. In one, authored several weeks before Kennedy's death, the President formally endorsed withdrawal from Vietnam of a thousand advisors by the end of 1963 (to be followed by complete withdrawal by the end of 1965). In the second, written six days after the assassination, LBJ reversed the withdrawal policy and planned in some detail the escalation to follow. Crucial to any reevaluation of JFK as President and statesman, this electrifying report portrays a wily, stubborn, conflicted leader who grasped realities that eluded virtually everyone else in the US establishment. -- Copyright ©1992, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved.
Newman argues that JFK showed in a series of key decisions such as his refusal to send in troops during the Laotian crisis at the beginning of his presidency despite calls from the Pentagon for troops and again during the Bay of Pigs disaster and a third time during the Missile Crisis that he was willing to ignore the suggestions by his military men and advisers and not send in troops.
And that he would have shown this same independence in Vietnam and not send in ground troops. He also says, by the way, that this why why elements in the Pentagon assassinated JFK; they viewed him as being "soft on communism" and that he was a threat to the security of the country.
In any case, maybe JFK would have rejected the suggestions to send in ground troops. Nobody knows. I don't think JFK knew on November 22, 1963 what he was going to do. But I think the evidence is pretty clear - to me - that at that time he had not made that decision to withdraw. It seems clear that at that stage they still thought - even JFK - that American power would win out and prevent the North from overruning the South.
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I don't think JFK knew on November 22, 1963 what he was going to do. But I think the evidence is pretty clear - to me - that at that time he had not made that decision to withdraw. It seems clear that at that stage they still thought - even JFK - that American power would win out and prevent the North from overruning the South.
Why do you think JFK authorized on paper in Oct 1963 the withdrawal of 1000 military personal by the end of 1963? To help him win re-election the following year rather than genuinely being sure the US would be pulling out of Vietnam in 1965?
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Newman argues that JFK showed in a series of key decisions such as his refusal to send in troops during the Laotian crisis at the beginning of his presidency despite calls from the Pentagon for troops and again during the Bay of Pigs disaster and a third time during the Missile Crisis that he was willing to ignore the suggestions by his military men and advisers and not send in troops.
And that he would have shown this same independence in Vietnam and not send in ground troops. He also says, by the way, that this why why elements in the Pentagon assassinated JFK; they viewed him as being "soft on communism" and that he was a threat to the security of the country.
In any case, maybe JFK would have rejected the suggestions to send in ground troops. Nobody knows. I don't think JFK knew on November 22, 1963 what he was going to do. But I think the evidence is pretty clear - to me - that at that time he had not made that decision to withdraw. It seems clear that at that stage they still thought - even JFK - that American power would win out and prevent the North from overruning the South.
He also says, by the way, that this why why elements in the Pentagon assassinated JFK; they viewed him as being "soft on communism" and that he was a threat to the security of the country
I can’t go along with that assessment. And I don’t have access to the book currently. But if I did I would probably take the time to refresh my memory on the details that Newman documented regarding the decision for supporting the Diem coup. That decision seems to be a major point in the argument that JFK was not going to withdraw from Vietnam.
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Why do you think JFK authorized on paper in Oct 1963 the withdrawal of 1000 military personal by the end of 1963? To help him win re-election the following year rather than genuinely being sure the US would be pulling out of Vietnam in 1965?
The withdrawal was, in my view, to put pressure on Diem to change his policies on the Buddhists. The plan to withdraw troops over time was always contingent on the ability of the South to take on more of the war. The US would draw down as the South ramped up its efforts.
The question then was what would happen if the South couldn't ramp up those efforts? RFK answered that question in 1964. Well, not directly:
Question: "And if [the South] Vietnamese were about to lose it, would he [JFK] propose to go in on land if he had to?
Kennedy: "Well, we'd face that when we came to it."
In November of 1963 they hadn't had to face that yet.
RFK also said this about the war:
Question: "What was the overwhelming reason [for our support of the South]?
Kennedy: "Just the loss of all of Southeast Asia if you lost Vietnam. I think everybody was quite clear that the rest of Southeast Asia would fall."
Question: "What if it did?"
Kennedy: "Just have profound effects as far as our position throughout the world, and our position in a rather vital part of the world. Also, it would affect what happened in India, of course, which in turn has an effect on the Middle East. Just, it would have, everybody felt, a very adverse effect. It would have an effect on Indonesia, hundred million population. All of these countries would be affected by the fall of Vietnam to the Communists, particularly as we had made such a fuss in the United States both under President Eisenhower and President Kennedy about the preservation of the integrity of Vietnam."
Question: "There was never any consideration given to pulling out?"
Kennedy: "No."
I don't think that was RFK engaging in public relations or blowing smoke. The Pentagon Papers and the biographies of McNamara and Rusk show this was true. There was no consideration at that time to simply leave.
Full RFK interview here: http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/vietnam.htm
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Here is RFK explaining how the Kennedy Administration viewed the importance of Vietnam and the ramifications if it fell (1964):
Kennedy: "Just the loss of all of Southeast Asia if you lost Vietnam. I think everybody was quite clear that the rest of Southeast Asia would fall."
Question: "What if it did?"
Kennedy: "Just have profound effects as far as our position throughout the world, and our position in a rather vital part of the world. Also, it would affect what happened in India, of course, which in turn has an effect on the Middle East. Just, it would have, everybody felt, a very adverse effect. It would have an effect on Indonesia, hundred million population. All of these countries would be affected by the fall of Vietnam to the Communists, particularly as we had made such a fuss in the United States both under President Eisenhower and President Kennedy about the preservation of the integrity of Vietnam."
If you tell the public these things - that a loss in Vietnam would have "profound effects" on the US position globally - then it's hard to walk that back and say "Nevermind" and simply leave. This is what JFK would have had to face. And what LBJ did face.
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JFK biographer Mr. Reeves says JFK caused the Vietnam war by authorizing the overthrow of Diem which occurred on Nov 1st 1963. 29-35 minutes on the below video:
This goes very much against the narrative James Douglas portrays in his book JFK And The Unspeakable in which he portrays JFK as a peace-loving hippie.
I wonder if JFK thought he could settle things in Vietnam using the overthrow in order to prevent Vietnam becoming an issue at the 1964 election. If so it was a very selfish thing to do as alot of people got killed in that war. Not of course did he intend that to happen, but he may have started the whole thing just to try and help him win the 1964 election.
peace loving hippie ? :)
Hyperbole?
Strawman?
Maybe both?
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It's quite simple. JFK wanted to stabilize and normalize relations with Cuba and the USSR and withdraw from Viet Nam. He made this clear in October by issuing NSAM 263 which directed the withdrawal of 1,000 American troops from Viet Nam by the end of 1963 and of the bulk of US forces by the end of 1965. Before the orders of the President could be carried out, he was shot through the head, the Johnson administration took the Gulf of Tonkin incident from the How to create a Casus Belli for Dummies book and the rest is history.
People pretend that November 22, 1963 was nothing more than a smooth transition of power and policy didn't change. It wasn't and it did. And not for the better.
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It's quite simple. JFK wanted to stabilize and normalize relations with Cuba and the USSR and withdraw from Viet Nam. He made this clear in October by issuing NSAM 263 which directed the withdrawal of 1,000 American troops from Viet Nam by the end of 1963 and of the bulk of US forces by the end of 1965. Before the orders of the President could be carried out, he was shot through the head, the Johnson administration took the Gulf of Tonkin incident from the How to create a Casus Belli for Dummies book and the rest is history.
People pretend that November 22, 1963 was nothing more than a smooth transition of power and policy didn't change. It wasn't and it did. And not for the better.
Sorry, it's more complicated then your explanation. JFK's supposed desire to "stabilize" relations was meaningless if the Soviets and Castro and North Vietnamese didn't want to do so as well. They had a vote on the matter; it wasn't simply up to JFK's wishes. He certainly wanted to avoid a confrontation with Moscow; he showed that during the missile crisis. But avoiding war is different then making peace, especially with an opponent that showed little if any interest in it.
In Vietnam, after Diem's overthrow (which, as noted in the original post, JFK approved of), the North stepped up its attacks on the South and at the same time the South couldn't put together a stable government that was capable of defending itself. It was the worst of both worlds. This was the situation LBJ inherited and one that JFK would have likely had to face.
In 1964 Khrushchev was overthrow by hardliners in the Politburo who were upset at his policies. They in turn took a harder line against the US, especially in Vietnam.
And in Cuba, LBJ ended almost all of the covert war on Cuba that the Kennedys put into place. JFK and RFK, in my view, didn't want to "stabilize" relations with Castro; they wanted Castro removed from power. And Castro didn't want to normalize relations with the US; he showed that for the entirety of his rule of the island.
As to the troop withdrawal from Vietnam: The withdrawal was always contingent on the ability of the South to take on the war at the same time. There was never a consideration at that time to simply leave. Read the first section of NSAM 263; that explains what the objective was. And it wasn't just to leave.
RFK himself said this in 1964:
Question: "There was never any consideration given to pulling out?"
Kennedy: "No."
Yes, there was no desire to go "all in" either; not at that time.
If you read McNamara's books on the issue he too said there was never a discussion of simply leaving. The idea was to help the South defend itself; not simply to cut and run. And the projected withdrawal of most troops by 1965 was overtaken by other events. Events that JFK and then LBJ had to face.
Again, JFK may have wanted normal relations with the communist world; the problem was that the other side had to agree with his wishes.
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Eisenhower initiated military action in Vietnam, not JFK.
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Eisenhower initiated military action in Vietnam, not JFK.
Yeah...see reply #9 Thumb1:
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Eisenhower initiated military action in Vietnam, not JFK.
Barely. 500 military advisors.
The big question is why didn't JFK automatically pull those 500 out when he became president in 1961. Just create an executive order. Was simple.
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Barely. 500 military advisors.
The big question is why didn't JFK automatically pull those 500 out when he became president in 1961. Just create an executive order. Was simple.
So your original question needs modifying to "why didn’t he get the US out?"
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So your original question needs modifying to "why didn’t he get the US out?"
I guess. Its something that has to be considered. "He was going to pull the US out of Vietnam" as Oliver Stone and the likes would say should be modified to "Why didn't he pull the US out of Vietnam as soon as he became President?".
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Dwight Eisenhower, not JFK, is the first President to send US military advisors to Vietnam.
I do think Kennedy wanted to get out of Vietnam but like any other US President, he wanted to withdraw in the least politically costly way. No President wants to “lose” a war.
Also, if there was a Conspiracy in Kennedy’s assassination, it more likely involved his Cuba policies, not his Vietnam policies...
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Dwight Eisenhower, not JFK, is the first President to send US military advisors to Vietnam.
Who was the first to bring them back?
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https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/nixons-retrospective-on-the-vietnam-war/ (https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/nixons-retrospective-on-the-vietnam-war/)
An interesting read. One could make an argument for Nixon at both ends.
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https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/nixons-retrospective-on-the-vietnam-war/ (https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/nixons-retrospective-on-the-vietnam-war/)
An interesting read. One could make an argument for Nixon at both ends.
There were way too many major and critical mistakes made by multiple entities during the US involvement. And spin and finger pointing are always a part of the political process. I believe that we have learned from the mistakes. Hopefully, we can use that knowledge to avoid future mistakes. Thanks for the link, a worthwhile read.
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In retrospect, it is easy to see where mistakes were made in Vietnam and the futility of that conflict. In the context of those times, however, the Cold War including the containment of commie expansion was the highest political priority. Dems politicians were vulnerable to suggestions that they were being soft on dealing with the Communists. As a result, the political reality for JFK in running for re-election in 1964 was that he had no real option but to maintain the US presence in Vietnam. LBJ was caught in the same trap. There was no real political option to say whoops we made a mistake and let the commies overrun S. Vietnam. It was a trap. As more and more resources and lives were devoted to the cause, it became all the more politically impossible to admit a miscalculation had been made. It took over a decade and the façade of a peace treaty before that could happen. As s result, it's highly unlikely JFK would have done anything much differently from LBJ. But Oswald made what JFK might have done no longer relevant. So thank him if you want to believe JFK would somehow have avoided that disaster.
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In retrospect, it is easy to see where mistakes were made in Vietnam and the futility of that conflict. In the context of those times, however, the Cold War including the containment of commie expansion was the highest political priority. Dems politicians were vulnerable to suggestions that they were being soft on dealing with the Communists. As a result, the political reality for JFK in running for re-election in 1964 was that he had no real option but to maintain the US presence in Vietnam. LBJ was caught in the same trap. There was no real political option to say whoops we made a mistake and let the commies overrun S. Vietnam. It was a trap. As more and more resources and lives were devoted to the cause, it became all the more politically impossible to admit a miscalculation had been made. It took over a decade and the façade of a peace treaty before that could happen. As s result, it's highly unlikely JFK would have done anything much differently from LBJ. But Oswald made what JFK might have done no longer relevant. So thank him if you want to believe JFK would somehow have avoided that disaster.
As cited in the original post - the discussion about the overthrow of Diem - JFK made a series of comittments to Vietnam that LBJ inherited and was forced to deal with. JFK may have not originally gotten the US into that swamp in the technical sense of being the first to send in troops et cetera; but his repeated statements about the dangers that a loss of the South posed to US interests and security (compounded by, as mentioned above, his support for the removal of Diem) made the possibility of simply reversing course, i.e., withdrawing troops, nonexistent.
One can argue that those statements were simply for domestic consumption, to fight off the charge of "losing Vietnam" the way Democrats earlier had to respond to the claim of "losing China", but they had real consequences for LBJ. JFK may have figured a way out of his rhetorical trap; but LBJ didn't have that option or ability. Or didn't think he did. As LBJ himself said in several calls he felt trapped, that it was a mess but he didn't know how to get out.
In any case, the claim that JFK was murdered because, in part, he had decided by November of 1963 to withdraw from Vietnam is simply not, in my view, supported by the facts. RFK said no decision had been made; McNamara said no such decision had been made; Rusk said no such decision had been made; and the Pentagon Papers show no such decision had been made.
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As cited in the original post - the discussion about the overthrow of Diem - JFK made a series of comittments to Vietnam that LBJ inherited and was forced to deal with. JFK may have not originally gotten the US into that swamp in the technical sense of being the first to send in troops et cetera; but his repeated statements about the dangers that a loss of the South to US interests and security (compounded by, as mentioned above, his support for the removal of Diem) made the possibility of simply reversing course, i.e., withdrawing troops, nonexistent.
One can argue that those statements were simply for domestic consumption, to fight off the charge of "losing Vietnam" the way Democrats earlier had to respond to the claim of "losing China", but they had real consequences for LBJ. JFK may have figured out a way out of his rhetorical trap; but LBJ didn't have that option. And LBJ himself said in several calls that he felt trapped; that it was a mess but he didn't know how to get out.
In any case, the claim that JFK was murdered because, in part, he had decided by November of 1963 to withdraw from Vietnam is simply not, in my view, supported by the facts. RFK said no decision had been made; McNamara said no such decision had been made; Rusk said no such decision had been made; and the Pentagon Papers show no such decision had been made.
I don't completely disagree with you, I just think a lot of folks in the LN community discount the huge amount of stuff we've learned about JFK, the Joint Chiefs, and Vietnam since the 1970s.
JFK clearly was reluctant to escalate in Vietnam and fought with the Joint Chiefs over it. He also was sympathetic to the anti-Colonial movements in Asia and Africa at the time. He understood the anti-Colonial aspect of the Vietnam conflict because he visited Vietnam in the 1950s back when the French had their Vietnam quagmire. he campaigned as a rabid Cold Warrior in 1960 but I think by now, most people understand that was just politics. Including the "Missile Gap" stuff that he knew was a lie.
So while I think it would've been difficult politically for Kennedy to withdraw from Vietnam in his second term(assuming he would've won re-election) I don't think we know for certain that he would've followed the same path as LBJ, who clearly had a better relationship with the Pentagon than Kennedy.
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Senator John F. Kennedy, US Senate, April 6, 1954:
'Mr. President, the time has come for the American people to be
told the blunt truth about Indochina.
I am reluctant to make any statement which may be misinterpreted
as unappreciative of the gallant French struggle at Dien Bien Phu
and elsewhere; or as partisan criticism of our Secretary of State
just prior to his participation in the delicate deliberations in
Geneva. Nor, as one who is not a member of those committees of
the Congress which have been briefed--if not consulted--on this
matter, do I wish to appear impetuous or alarmist in my evaluation
of the situation.
But to pour money, material, and men into the jungles of Indochina without
at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile
and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of "united action" assumes
the inevitability of such victory; but such assumptions are not unlike
similar predictions of confidence which have lulled the American people
for many years and which, if continued, would present an improper
basis for determining the extent of American participation.
Despite this series of optimistic reports about eventual victory,
every member of the Senate knows that such victory today appears
to be desperately remote, to say the least, despite tremendous
amounts of economic and materiel aid from the United States, and
despite a deplorable loss of French Union manpower. The call
for either negotiations or additional participation by other nations
underscores the remoteness of such a final victory today, regardless
of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu. It is, of course, for these reasons
that many French are reluctant to continue the struggle without
greater assistance; for to record the sapping effect which time
and the enemy have had on their will and strength in that area
is not to disparage their valor. If "united action" can achieve the
necessary victory over the forces of communism, and thus preserve the
security and freedom of all Southeast Asia, then such united action is
clearly called for. But if, on the other hand, the increase in
our aid and the utilization of our troops would only result in
further statements of confidence without ultimate victory over
aggression, then now is the time when we must evaluate the conditions
under which that pledge is made.
I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military
assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere
and at the same time nowhere, "an enemy of the people" which has
the sympathy and covert support of the people.
Moreover, without political independence for the Associated States, the
other Asiatic nations have made it clear that they regard this
as a war of colonialism; and the "united action" which is said
to be so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely
to end up as unilateral action by our own country. Such intervention,
without participation by the armed forces of the other nations
of Asia, without the support of the great masses of the people
of the Associated States, with increasing reluctance and discouragement
on the part of the French--and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese
Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation
of our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground--such
intervention, Mr. President, would be virtually impossible in
the type of military situation which prevails in Indochina.
This is not a new point, of course. In November of 1951, I reported upon
my return from the Far East as follows:
In Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort
of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire. There
is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam government among
the people of that area. To check the southern drive of communism
makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms.
The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment
within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather
than upon the legions of General de Lattre. To do this apart from
and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed
failure.
In June of last year, I sought an amendment to the Mutual Security Act
which would have provided for the distribution of American aid,
to the extent feasible, in such a way as to encourage the freedom
and independence desired by the people of the Associated States
My amendment was soundly defeated on the grounds that we should
not pressure France into taking action on this delicate situation;
and that the new French government could be expected to make "a
decision which would obviate the necessity of this kind of amendment
or resolution." The distinguished majority leader [Mr. Knowland]
assured us that "We will all work, in conjunction with our great
ally, France, toward the freedom of the people of those states."
Every year we are given three sets of assurances: First, that
the independence of the Associated States is now complete; second,
that the independence of the Associated States will soon be completed
under steps "now" being undertaken; and, third, that military victory
for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just
around the corner, or lies two years off. But the stringent limitations
upon the status of the Associated States as sovereign states remain;
and the fact that military victory has not yet been achieved is
largely the result of these limitations. Repeated failure of these
prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the frequency of
their reiteration, and they have caused this nation to delay definitive
action until now the opportunity for any desirable solution may
well be past.
It is time, therefore, for us to face the stark reality of the
difficult situation before us without the false hopes which predictions
of military victory and assurances of complete independence have
given us in the past. The hard truth of the matter is, first,
that without the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated
States, without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable
officer corps, a military victory, even with American support,
in that area is difficult if not impossible, of achievement; and,
second, that the support of the people of that area cannot be
obtained without a change in the contractual relationships which
presently exist between the Associated States and the French Union.
If the French persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate
independence and freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated
States; and if those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain
aloof from the conflict, as they have in the past, then it is
my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance
at Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men
and machines into that hopeless internecine struggle.
The facts and alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But
in a nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest
appreciation of such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy can be
effectively maintained. In an era of supersonic attack and atomic
retaliation, extended public debate and education are of no avail, once
such a policy must be implemented. The time to study, to doubt, to review,
and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may well rest the peace and
security of the world, and, indeed, the very continued existence
of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this decision to the people,
then, as Thomas Jefferson once said: "If we think them not enlightened
enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the
remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion
by education."
-
Senator John F. Kennedy, US Senate, April 6, 1954:
'Mr. President, the time has come for the American people to be
told the blunt truth about Indochina.
I am reluctant to make any statement which may be misinterpreted
as unappreciative of the gallant French struggle at Dien Bien Phu
and elsewhere; or as partisan criticism of our Secretary of State
just prior to his participation in the delicate deliberations in
Geneva. Nor, as one who is not a member of those committees of
the Congress which have been briefed--if not consulted--on this
matter, do I wish to appear impetuous or alarmist in my evaluation
of the situation.
But to pour money, material, and men into the jungles of Indochina without
at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile
and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of "united action" assumes
the inevitability of such victory; but such assumptions are not unlike
similar predictions of confidence which have lulled the American people
for many years and which, if continued, would present an improper
basis for determining the extent of American participation.
Despite this series of optimistic reports about eventual victory,
every member of the Senate knows that such victory today appears
to be desperately remote, to say the least, despite tremendous
amounts of economic and materiel aid from the United States, and
despite a deplorable loss of French Union manpower. The call
for either negotiations or additional participation by other nations
underscores the remoteness of such a final victory today, regardless
of the outcome at Dien Bien Phu. It is, of course, for these reasons
that many French are reluctant to continue the struggle without
greater assistance; for to record the sapping effect which time
and the enemy have had on their will and strength in that area
is not to disparage their valor. If "united action" can achieve the
necessary victory over the forces of communism, and thus preserve the
security and freedom of all Southeast Asia, then such united action is
clearly called for. But if, on the other hand, the increase in
our aid and the utilization of our troops would only result in
further statements of confidence without ultimate victory over
aggression, then now is the time when we must evaluate the conditions
under which that pledge is made.
I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military
assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere
and at the same time nowhere, "an enemy of the people" which has
the sympathy and covert support of the people.
Moreover, without political independence for the Associated States, the
other Asiatic nations have made it clear that they regard this
as a war of colonialism; and the "united action" which is said
to be so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely
to end up as unilateral action by our own country. Such intervention,
without participation by the armed forces of the other nations
of Asia, without the support of the great masses of the people
of the Associated States, with increasing reluctance and discouragement
on the part of the French--and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese
Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation
of our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground--such
intervention, Mr. President, would be virtually impossible in
the type of military situation which prevails in Indochina.
This is not a new point, of course. In November of 1951, I reported upon
my return from the Far East as follows:
In Indochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort
of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire. There
is no broad, general support of the native Vietnam government among
the people of that area. To check the southern drive of communism
makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms.
The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment
within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather
than upon the legions of General de Lattre. To do this apart from
and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed
failure.
In June of last year, I sought an amendment to the Mutual Security Act
which would have provided for the distribution of American aid,
to the extent feasible, in such a way as to encourage the freedom
and independence desired by the people of the Associated States
My amendment was soundly defeated on the grounds that we should
not pressure France into taking action on this delicate situation;
and that the new French government could be expected to make "a
decision which would obviate the necessity of this kind of amendment
or resolution." The distinguished majority leader [Mr. Knowland]
assured us that "We will all work, in conjunction with our great
ally, France, toward the freedom of the people of those states."
Every year we are given three sets of assurances: First, that
the independence of the Associated States is now complete; second,
that the independence of the Associated States will soon be completed
under steps "now" being undertaken; and, third, that military victory
for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just
around the corner, or lies two years off. But the stringent limitations
upon the status of the Associated States as sovereign states remain;
and the fact that military victory has not yet been achieved is
largely the result of these limitations. Repeated failure of these
prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the frequency of
their reiteration, and they have caused this nation to delay definitive
action until now the opportunity for any desirable solution may
well be past.
It is time, therefore, for us to face the stark reality of the
difficult situation before us without the false hopes which predictions
of military victory and assurances of complete independence have
given us in the past. The hard truth of the matter is, first,
that without the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated
States, without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable
officer corps, a military victory, even with American support,
in that area is difficult if not impossible, of achievement; and,
second, that the support of the people of that area cannot be
obtained without a change in the contractual relationships which
presently exist between the Associated States and the French Union.
If the French persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate
independence and freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated
States; and if those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain
aloof from the conflict, as they have in the past, then it is
my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance
at Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men
and machines into that hopeless internecine struggle.
The facts and alternatives before us are unpleasant, Mr. President. But
in a nation such as ours, it is only through the fullest and frankest
appreciation of such facts and alternatives that any foreign policy can be
effectively maintained. In an era of supersonic attack and atomic
retaliation, extended public debate and education are of no avail, once
such a policy must be implemented. The time to study, to doubt, to review,
and revise is now, for upon our decisions now may well rest the peace and
security of the world, and, indeed, the very continued existence
of mankind. And if we cannot entrust this decision to the people,
then, as Thomas Jefferson once said: "If we think them not enlightened
enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the
remedy is not to take it from them but to inform their discretion
by education."
Doesn't sound like a guy who bought into the "Domino Theory" stuff...
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Doesn't sound like a guy who bought into the "Domino Theory" stuff...
Then you're again saying that all of those statements by him - and RFK - were lies? And you think a speech on the Senate floor in 1954 - in '54? - is evidence of his later views in 1963? When he later said - to Cronkite in September of '63 - that he believed in the theory he was, well, openly lying? And when RFK said similar things in 1964 he too was lying?
We have the statements by McNamara, the statements by Rusk, by Bundy, by RFK and all sorts of documents indicating that the theory was believed by the Administration. And on the other hand we have a floor speech in 1954. So which to believe?
Here is RFK on JFK's reason for winning: "Just the loss of all of Southeast Asia if you lost Vietnam. I think everybody was quite clear that the rest of Southeast Asia would fall."
You seem to believe, again, that all of these statements could be later simply made to disappear. That he could explicitly and repeatedly say that a loss in Vietnam would lead to the loss of SE Asia and would harm American security and then just say he didn't mean it?
Look, clearly JFK wanted to try and normalize and "calm" down US-Soviet relations, to reduce the chances of war between the two sides. He recognized something that many of his top advisers - particularly in the Pentagon - didn't: that a nuclear war was simply not winnable, that, as he said, after such a war the living would envy the dead, and that the use of such horrible weapons had to be a very last resort. Very last. But that doesn't mean he was some sort of dove, someone who didn't believe that Moscow and communism (read his views on Mao) weren't were existential threats to the West. He wanted peace but he wasn't going to surrender.
FWIW, I think the situation in Vietnam in 1954, which was well before Moscow and Beijing started supporting Hanoi, was completely different than in 1963 when they were clearly supporting the North. In '54 it looked to be a quite different situation in terms of the Cold War then in 1963.
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At least LN theory fared better.
-
Then you're again saying that all of those statements by him - and RFK - were lies? And you think a speech on the Senate floor in 1954 - in '54? - is evidence of his later views in 1963? When he later said - to Cronkite in September of '63 - that he believed in the theory he was, well, openly lying? And when RFK said similar things in 1964 he too was lying?
We have the statements by McNamara, the statements by Rusk, by Bundy, by RFK and all sorts of documents indicating that the theory was believed by the Administration. And on the other hand we have a floor speech in 1954. So which to believe?
Both men were politicians. In those times, Democrats had to take a tough line on Communism publicly in order to defend against the "soft on Communism" label.
Given JFK's somewhat sympathetic view of anti-Colonial movements in his time combined with his well documented resistance to the Pentagon's efforts to escalate US involvement in Vietnam during his first term, it remains plausible that he wouldn't have made the same mistakes as LBJ. I don't think we can assume that he would've taken the same exact path.
But I'm also aware of the fact that it was politically risky for him to be viewed as "losing Vietnam to the Commies" and in the end, politics might have won.
It's very similar to the logic that has kept the US in Afghanistan for almost 20 years.
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Well we know now that JFK lied about the Missile Gap stuff during the 1960 campaign. So why not extend that to other contradictory things that he said?
We also know that RFK basically endorsed the Warren Report publicly while privately investigating his brother's murder because he suspected a conspiracy from day 1.
So RFK's public statements can't be taken at face value either.
Both men were politicians. In those times, Democrats had to take a tough line on Communism publicly in order to defend against the "soft on Communism" label.
Given JFK's somewhat sympathetic view of anti-Colonial movements in his time combined with his well documented resistance to the Pentagon's efforts to escalate US involvement in Vietnam during his first term, it remains plausible that he wouldn't have made the same mistakes as LBJ. I don't think we can assume that he would've taken the same exact path.
But I'm also aware of the fact that it was politically risky for him to be viewed as "losing Vietnam to the Commies" and in the end, politics might have won.
It's very similar to the logic that has kept the US in Afghanistan for almost 20 years.
Jon, for someone as sensitive as you seem to be about accuracy, please explain to readers how any of what is presented in the academic research and analysis below was JFK's fault. He was a politician in 1960 running for the office of POTUS against Nixon, of all people. What are you actually accusing JFK of doing in that 1960 campaign that you've had no similar negative reaction to a republican or Trump party candidate doing, 1960 to 2020?
https://www.academia.edu/4849570/Who_Ever_Believed_in_the_Missile_Gap_John_F_Kennedy_and_the_Politics_of_National_Security
(https://live.staticflickr.com/65535/51125968354_db3ba33685_c.jpg)
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Jon, for someone as sensitive as you seem to be about accuracy, please explain to readers how any of what is presented in the academic research and analysis beow was JFK's fault. He was a politician in 1960 running for the office of POTUS against Nixon, of all people. What are you actually accusing JFK of doing in that 1960 campaign that you've had no similar negative reaction to a republican or Trump party candidate doing, 1960 to 2020?
https://www.academia.edu/4849570/Who_Ever_Believed_in_the_Missile_Gap_John_F_Kennedy_and_the_Politics_of_National_Security
(https://live.staticflickr.com/65535/51125968354_db3ba33685_c.jpg)
You're correct. It's not accurate to say JFK lied about the Missile Gap. He wasn't brought into the loop about the issue until he became President.
My broader point still stands. We shouldn't take everything politicians say at face value. In JFK's case, what he said and did privately sometimes contradicted his public stances on the Soviets and Southeast Asia.
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http://www.jfk-info.com/files.htm
THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON TRANSITION:
THE CASE FOR POLICY REVERSAL
by DR. JOHN M. NEWMAN.
~snip~
Combat Troops: Just Another Notch or a Fork in the Road?
"What was American policy in Vietnam in the early 1960s? From early in his administration,
President Kennedy accepted that the primary American objective was to prevent the communist
domination of South Vietnam. There was never any argument over the ends of American Vietnam policy
under Kennedy, but there was an argument over the means to be employed to achieve those ends. More
specifically, President Kennedy's policy was to assist the South Vietnamese to prevent the communist
domination of their country. The prohibition against engaging in another American land war in
Asia was a fundamental policy of the Kennedy Administration, and one which President Johnson actually
endorsed in 1964.
To deny that the decision to send in ground combat units did not reverse this long-standing feature
of American Vietnam policy simply ignores the most basic facts. A popular proposition used by observers
who dispute that the use of combat troops reversed US policy is the "gradual slide" argument, which holds
that, on a so-called "policy continuum", ground combat units simply represent the next rung on the ladder
of escalation. In other words, when the marines waded ashore it was as if the mercury in the
thermometer went from 72 to 73 degrees. Under Kennedy the temperature increased so
many degrees and under Johnson it increased so many degrees and, since both were in the same
direction, Johnson simply continued the policy.
Such arguments blur the crucial distinction between a policy of advising the South Vietnamese army
how to fight the war and a policy using the American army to fight the war. From any perspective, not the
least of which was the Viet Cong's, the difference between the South Vietnamese army and the American
army was not subtle, and neither was the difference between the Special Forces, on the one hand, and the
Marines or 82D Airborne Division, on the other. These differences are fundamental, and to construe a
large increase in advisors as something only slightly less or a little different than brigades and divisions of
ground forces is just nonsense.
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson could have further deepened American commitments and ratcheted
up American participation in the war effort without crossing the Rubicon of conventional forces in Vietnam.
Sending in the American army was nothing less than taking a different turn at the main fork in the
road to Vietnam. There are those who argue that the Kennedy Administration never faced this fork in
the road, and that the dire situation faced by Johnson only developed after Kennedy's unfortunate demise.
This argument is misinformed, as the record of Kennedy's first year in office makes unequivocally
clear."
1961: NSAM-111 and the Limits to American Involvement
"What does the record of the Kennedy Administration's first year reveal about Vietnam policy?
What was the situation? What was the President told and how were the policy choices framed? What
policy did Kennedy choose?
The political and military situation in Vietnam was already critical and deteriorating further by the
time Kennedy was inaugurated in January 1961. For the first three months the worsening situation in
Vietnam was overshadowed by the crisis in Laos, but over the summer and fall of 1961 Vietnam became
the focus of American attention in Indochina. As the military situation became increasingly critical, calls
within the Administration for the use of American combat forces in Vietnam prompted a major debate over
Vietnam policy in October-November 1961, a debate Kennedy finally resolved with one of his most
important decisions on Vietnam: National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM)-111, promulgated on
November 22, 1961.
The President sent his top experts to Vietnam for a look while the concerned departments and
intelligence agencies in Washington studied the situation anew. All of this activity produced a veritable
slew of proposals about what to do, and although there were differences between many of them, most all
advocated sending American combat troops to Vietnam. The argument that Kennedy was never
confronted with the situation that Johnson was, that Kennedy did not face the sort of difficult choices that
Johnson later did, is an argument which ignores the heart of the Kennedy record on this matter.
Kennedy was told in no uncertain terms that the military situation in Vietnam was critical and that
the fate of South Vietnam hung in the balance. Moreover, Kennedy's advisors framed the issue this way:
that the loss of South Vietnam to the communists would affect vital US interests regionally and globally,
and that the only way to prevent such an outcome was to send in American ground forces.4 The
President was told that nothing short of several American combat divisions could save South Vietnam. It
was in that dire context and against those forceful arguments that Kennedy said no to American combat
forces in Vietnam. The record on this permits no argument and no wiggle room. Kennedy was
irreconcilably opposed to an American ground war in Vietnam.
Instead of combat troops, Kennedy agreed to a substantial increase in American advisors. This
decision was implemented under the provisions of NSAM-111. Those observers who cite this decision as
evidence that Kennedy pushed a reluctant military into Vietnam obviously haven't a clue about the context
in which this decision was made. When the situation, the recommendations and Kennedy's decision are
looked at as a whole, they boil down to this: even when Kennedy was told the only workable solution
was conventional American forces, he would only agree to assisting the South Vietnamese army fight their
war."
~snip~
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Both men were politicians. In those times, Democrats had to take a tough line on Communism publicly in order to defend against the "soft on Communism" label.
Given JFK's somewhat sympathetic view of anti-Colonial movements in his time combined with his well documented resistance to the Pentagon's efforts to escalate US involvement in Vietnam during his first term, it remains plausible that he wouldn't have made the same mistakes as LBJ. I don't think we can assume that he would've taken the same exact path.
But I'm also aware of the fact that it was politically risky for him to be viewed as "losing Vietnam to the Commies" and in the end, politics might have won.
It's very similar to the logic that has kept the US in Afghanistan for almost 20 years.
Well, we're going around in circles.
As I've said (sorry for the repetition), the evidence that JFK was sincere in his beliefs is supported by the statements by the men around him - McNamara, Bundy, Rusk, JFK RFK - and the documents. The Pentagon Papers document the internal discussions going on in the Administration as to what to do about Vietnam.
This isn't just JFK spouting off lines to protect himself from criticism about "losing Vietnam." They sincerely thought that a loss of the South would have ramifications for all of SE Asia and would danger American interests and security. They didn't view this as a internal anti-colonial effort by the North. They saw it through the perspective of the Cold War. And the evidence is they were worried about Chinese support for Hanoi more than Moscow's. And from what I've read, Moscow, both under Stalin and then Khrushchev, was reluctant to support Hanoi; they thought it was useless for their interests, that Mao's interests would be better served by a conflict there if they helped (the Sino/Soviet split was deep and real); and they were more concerned with other matters such as Berlin. That all changed after Khrushchev was removed.
The Pentagon Papers says this, something that I think accurately summarizes JFK's view:
"In the course of these policy debates [i.e., how to deal with Diem], several participants pursued the logical but painful conclusion that if the war could not be won with Diem, and if his removal would lead to political chaos and also jeopardize the war effort, then the war was probably unwinnable. If that were the case, the argument went, then the U.S. should really be facing a more basic decision of either an orderly disengagement from an irretrievable situation, or a major escalation of the U.S. involvement, including the use of U.S. combat troops. These prophetic minority voices were, however, raising an unpleasant prospect
that the [Kennedy] Administration was unprepared to face at that time. In hindsight, however, it is clear that this was one of the times in the history of our Vietnam involvement when we were making fundamental choices. The option to disengage honorably at that time now appears an attractively low-cost one. But for the Kennedy Administration the costs no doubt appeared much higher. In any event, it proved to be unwilling to accept the implications of predictions for a bleak future. The Administration hewed to the belief that if the US be but willing to exercise its power, it could ultimately have its way in world affairs.
Again: "The costs [for a withdrawal] no doubt appeared higher..... [And they] hewed to the belief that if the US be but willing to exercise its power, it could ultimately have its way in world affairs." Whether or not JFK himself believed in the "domino theory" or not the evidence is powerful, for me, that he simply didn't believe we could just walk away.
The entire section, well worth a read, on the Diem crisis and its aftermath is here: https://nara-media-001.s3.amazonaws.com/arcmedia/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-IV-B-5.pdf
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Well, we're going around in circles.
As I've said (sorry for the repetition), the evidence that JFK was sincere in his beliefs is supported by the statements by the men around him - McNamara, Bundy, Rusk, JFK - and the documents. The Pentagon Papers document the internal discussions going on in the Administration as to what to do about Vietnam.
This isn't just JFK spouting off lines to protect himself from criticism about "losing Vietnam."
The Pentagon Papers say this, something that I think accurately summarizes JFK's view:
"In the course of these policy debates [i.e., how to deal with Diem], several participants pursued the logical but painful conclusion that if the war could not be won with Diem, and if his removal would lead to political chaos and also jeopardize the war effort, then the war was probably unwinnable. If that were the case, the argument went, then the U.S. should really be facing a more basic decision of either an orderly disengagement from an irretrievable situation, or a major escalation of the U.S. involvement, including the use of U.S. combat troops. These prophetic minority voices were, however, raising an unpleasant prospect
that the [Kennedy] Administration was unprepared to face at that time. In hindsight, however, it is clear that this was one of the times in the history of our Vietnam involvement when we were making fundamental choices. The option to disengage honorably at that time now appears an attractively low-cost one. But for the Kennedy Administration the costs no doubt appeared much higher. In any event, it proved to be unwilling to accept the implications of predictions for a bleak future. The Administration hewed to the belief that if the US be but willing to exercise its power, it could ultimately have its way in world affairs.
Again: "The Administration hewed to the belief that if the US be but willing to exercise its power, it could ultimately have its way in world affairs." Whether or not JFK himself believed in the "domino theory" or not the evidence is powerful, for me, that he simply didn't believe we should walk away.
The entire section, well worth a read, on the Diem crisis and its aftermath is here: https://nara-media-001.s3.amazonaws.com/arcmedia/research/pentagon-papers/Pentagon-Papers-Part-IV-B-5.pdf
Why not simply assess and present what JFK left LBJ with, VS what LBJ did, with what JFK left him with?
Example, does this, in any way, indicate JFK was preparing the U.S. public for an escalation?
https://www.maryferrell.org/showDoc.html?docId=945#relPageId=119
(https://live.staticflickr.com/65535/51138831170_a5393a4d13_b.jpg)
http://jfk.hood.edu/Collection/Weisberg%20Subject%20Index%20Files/T%20Disk/Tiger%20to%20Ride%20Moscow%20Conference/Item%2028.pdf
(https://live.staticflickr.com/65535/51137086412_acf0f80afb_b.jpg)