http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/jfk/NARA-Oct2017/NARA-Nov-2017/104-10431-10126.pdf
From the same mostly inaccurate piece by Cram, but a little earlier:
The Storm Birds: Soyiet Post-War Defectors by Gordon Brook-Shepherd; Weidenfeld and Nicolson (London), 1988--303 pages
Gordon Brook-Shepherd, a British foreign correspondent turned historian, has with publication of this book done the best work of his long career. As intelligence history dealing with Soviet post-war defectors, it is not only an exciting read but is factually accurate in almost every respect. Compressed within its 303 pages is the story of how the Western intelligence services, largely denied the possibility of obtaining information from within the Soviet Union, came to realize the enormous intelligence value of those soviets who risked their lives to make the leap to freedom. More importantly, the author has immersed himself thoroughly in the voluminous detail about the defectors so that he comprehends the events which influenced the secret world of intelligence, with the result his judgments are objective and fair. The author likely achieved this kind of professional knowledge partly from work on his earlier book,
The Storm Petrels, which recounted the story of pre-war defectors from the Soviet Union. With this experience plus generous help from CIA and the British intelligence services, Brook-Shepherd has written a fascinating account of how and why so many senior Soviet intelligence officials defected and their impact on the West. The author deals with his complex subject in chronological fashion starting with the first post-war defector, Igor Gouzenko, in Canada. It is difficult today to comprehend how little knowledge the West, governments as well as people, possessed about Soviet espionage and subversive activity prior to Gouzenko's defection in September 1945. This event and the revelations that flowed from it stunned both statesmen and the public. It had an enormous effect in America where it was coupled with defections of Americans such as Elizabeth Bentley, Louis Budenz, Whittaker Chambers, etc. from communism, all of whom made a contribution to the growing mass of evidence about Soviet illegal activities. In Canada where Prime Minister Mackenzie King seemed almost unable to grasp the enormity of Soviet transgressions, it had the salutary effect of establishing the groundwork for a security service in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In Britain the Gouzenko information also had an electric affect, but agents such as Philby were often able behind the scenes to blunt its force. (For example, it is known that Philby managed single handedly, without drawing attention to himself, to prevent amajor position paper urging stronger action against the Soviets from reaching the Prime Minister.) Although Gouzenko was the first Soviet intelligence officer to defect post-war and the impact of his disclosures are almost beyond measure, the author does not include him amongst the post-war defectors he describes as "giants." He
defines a giant as one who dominated the scene in the sense that his contribution went far beyond his normal professional assets to play a certain strategic role in post-war history. The three he places in this category are Penkovsky, "Farewell," and Gordievsky.
.....
Penkovsky, "Farewell," and Gordievsky, were "Giants," huh?
Well, at least he got one of them right: Penkovsky; betrayed by Sir Roger Hollis and maybe one other person about two weeks after he'd volunteered to work for MI-6 and CIA.
That is if Brook-Shepherd meant contributions to
Western intelligence services. (LOL)
Gordievsky, Oleg: KGB colonel who agreed in 1974 to collaborate with British Intelligence in Copenhagen. While he was serving in London in the 1980s the KGB learned of his collaboration and recalled him to Moscow,
where he was interrogated but did not confess (LOL). He managed to flee the USSR and subsequently made his life in England.
Chapter 16. Connections
1 . The KGB was spreading stories of its plans to assassinate Nosenko. (LOL) The KGB counterintelligence chief in New York told his colleague
Oleg Gordievsky in the late 1960s that his prime murder targets in the United States were Nosenko and Anatoly Golitsyn (C. Andrew and O. Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story [New York: HarperCoIlins, 1990], 585).
Chapter 20. Lingering Debate
1 . Of the fifteen, thirteen are named: “Kitty Hawk” [Igor Kochnov], Ilya Dzhirkvelov, Yuri Loginov, Aleksandr Cherepanov, Vitaly Yurchenko, and apparently Yuri Krotkov, as well as Vladimir Kuzichkin, Viktor Gundarev, Ivan Bogatyy, the Illegal “Rudolf Herrmann,”
Vladimir Vetrov (alias "Farewell”),
Oleg Gordievsky, and Oleg Lyalin. Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior. Janies Jesus Angleton: The CIA’s Master Spy Hunter (New York and London: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 365 n53.
2. House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, Hearings (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979) (hereafter HSCA Hearings), Vol. 4, 60.
3. Those five were Cherepanov, Loginov, Krotkov, Lyalin, and Vetrov.
The text (from Spy Wars, pg 209) for the above footnotes:After they had decided once and for all that Nosenko genuinely defected and was telling the truth, CIA insiders spread the happy word that they had received “convincing” confirmation from later KGB sources.
“All of the KGB defectors since 1964— who were in a position to know about the Nosenko case and whose bona fides have been absolutely verified by the CIA— have strongly supported Nosenko,” they told an investigative journalist in the 1980s. They numbered “more than fifteen in all” and were “uniformly incredulous to learn from the Americans that Nosenko was ever doubted.”
1 An official CIA spokesman (John L. Hart) was later to tell Congress the same story.
2 Fifteen confirmations might make a convincing case— but not these fifteen. In actuality these sources had not been “in a position to know,” nor were their "bona fides absolutely verified.” Five of them had never mentioned Nosenko at all, and others were not even in the KGB when Nosenko defected.
3 Not one of the fifteen had firsthand knowledge, much less had any of them been in a position to learn of the KGB’s tightly compartmentalized deception operations. Those who were not lying or fabricating were presumably repeating what they had been told either officially or by corridor gossip— and in fact false accounts were being circulated. Another KGB officer was told that no fewer than “forty colonels” had been bred as a result of Nosenko’s defection— but after reflection and discussion with other officers recognized the story to be false and an intentional plant within the KGB. 4 Three KGB veterans who talked with me after the Cold War seemed to believe these planted tales or rumors because they assumed (wrongly, as later events would show) that the KGB would never use one of its staff officers as a defector. One Illegal, alias “Rudy Herrmann,’’ reported that he had been told to try to find Nosenko in the United States— but he could not know why. (The KGB must have been wondering why Nosenko had dropped off their radar screen.)
To label all these sources "absolutely verified bona fide” was grotesque. Suspicions hung over six of the fifteen. 5 If even one of those six was a KGB plant, a skeptic
might wonder why the KGB, through that plant, had vouched for Nosenko.
There were, outside this list, more authoritative KGB sources, with more direct knowledge. What did they say about Nosenko— especially in more relaxed conditions after the end of the Cold War? Some said flatly that Nosenko was lying, others inadvertently revealed it by contradicting Nosenko’s stories, and the best-informed felt sure the KGB had planted him on CIA. For example:
• In his 1995 memoirs, Filipp BoBary Kampov, deputy chief of KGB counter- intelligence (Second Chief Directorate, or SCD) and Nosenko’s boss at the time, twisted the facts and ignored Nosenko’s 1962 meetings with CIA, by then well known even to the public. He wrote that Nosenko went to Geneva for “serious operational tasks”— not the way the KGB describes delegation watchdogging. The KGB chairman at the time, Vladimir Semichastniy, said Nosenko had been sent to Geneva to work on “some woman” with an aim to recruit her. (Nosenko apparently did not know this.) Semichastniy said Nosenko had been “expelled from every school he attended” and had got into the KGB only with the help of (then deputy) chairman Ivan Serov. (Nosenko did not know this, either; he named a different high-level sponsor, equally unlikely.) 6
• A later KGB chairman, Vadim Bakatin, along with former KGB foreign-counterintelligence chief Oleg Kalugin, told the chief counsel of the House Select Committee on Assassinations that Nosenko had “exaggerated and lied about his knowledge of Oswald.” 7
• Oleg Kalugin reported that Nosenko did not serve in the American Department of the SCD in 1960-1961.
• A veteran of the SCD’s American Department at the time said Nosenko had served only one year, from 1952 to 1953, in the American Department. He had performed badly and was shunted off to the nonoperational department that handled routine liaison with other Soviet institutions.
• A KGB veteran told me after the Cold War that Nosenko did not hold the KGB jobs he listed for CIA and that the circumstances suggested to him that the SCD (specifically, its 14th Department, for operational deception) had dispatched Nosenko to deceive CIA.
Quite a different story came from a clumsy KGB effort to support and enhance Nosenko’s image in American eyes. In the early 1990s they put an official hie on Nosenko into the hands of KGB veteran Colonel Oleg Nechiporenko. It was ostensibly to help him write a memoir of his encounter with Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City a few weeks before Oswald assassinated President Kennedy— never mind that Nosenko was entirely irrelevant to this subject. Nechiporenko thereupon devoted fifty pages— under the title “Paranoia vs. Common Sense’’— to make the point that CIA (and specifically me, Pete Bagley) had been stupid not to recognize the great good luck that had fallen into CIA’s lap with Nosenko’s defection. Like others, he stressed the “colossal damage” that this defection had done to the KGB and the near-panic it caused to high-level KGB chiefs and to Khrushchev himself. But the attempt backfired. That KGB file contradicted a lot of what Nosenko had told us about his early life and entry into the KGB, and Nechiporenko’s book told things about Oswald that Nosenko must have known if he had really had access to Oswald’s hie— but did not know. 8
Nechiporenko revealed that books like his own were actually parts of ongoing KGB operations. A West German editor complained to him, at about the time Nechiporenko’s own book was appearing, that another author, Oleg Tumanov, was refusing to fill in the details in his manuscriptrecounting his twenty years as a KGB penetration agent inside Radio Liberty. You are naive, Nechiporenko replied, to expect details. Tumanov, he explained, “was a link, a part of an operation. . . . And this operation isn’t completed.” If the author were to tell all, "CIA would know what the KGB was doing today and tomorrow. The KGB is not dead.” 9
Even if this still-living KGB was carrying on an unfinished operation, its use of Nechiporenko to attack me was like using a battering ram against an open door. CIA itself had disowned my position, had used some of the same words as Nechiporenko to denigrate me (and others who had distrusted Nosenko), and had been happily employing Nosenko for a quarter century. Why then this late, gratuitous assault? Could they still fear that CIA might reverse its position on Nosenko and finally look into the implications underlying his case? As far as I know, the KGB need have no fear on that front.
Nechiporenko’s position in this ongoing KGB game contrasts oddly with the new line on Nosenko that was emerging in Moscow. After years of vilifying Nosenko for the damage he did the KGB and condemning him to death, KGB spokesmen were beginning to suggest that Nosenko did not defect at all. Their new line was that he fell into a trap and was kidnapped by CIA. After the assassination of President Kennedy, so this story goes, CIA learned (through what a KGB-sponsored article fantasized as a far-flung agent network in Russia) that a KGB officer named Nosenko had inside knowledge about Lee Harvey Oswald. So when that target came to Geneva (to recruit a woman connected with French Intelligence) a CIA “action group” under Pete Bagley, working on direct orders from CIA director Richard Helms and Soviet Division chief David Murphy, drugged and kidnapped him, in order to pump him for information about Oswald’s sojourn in Russia. 10
One can only speculate on the KGB’s purpose in creating such a fantasy. Might they be preparing Nosenko ’s return to Russia without punishment like the later "CIA kidnap victim” Yurchenko? Whatever the reason, this change of posture reflected Moscow’s growing readiness to admit that Nosenko’s defection was not as previously presented. Finally, CIA will be left alone in believing in Nosenko.
For a few years after the Agency in 1968 made its official finding in Nosenko’s favor, CIA did not speak with a single voice. The leadership of its Counterintelligence Staff under James Angleton judged Nosenko to be a KGB plant, and its operations chief Newton S. (“Scotty”) Miler continued to probe into what lay behind the KGB’s operation.
Two former KGB officers, Peter Deriabin and Anatoly Golitsyn, after learning about Nosenko’s case in detail (Deriabin had even questioned him personally— see Appendix A) were certain that Nosenko had been dispatched by the KGB and was lying about his KGB activities and career. As Deriabin put it, any KGB officer knowing the facts would be equally convinced. He was right. After the Cold War a KGB officer, after reading some of CIA’s questions and Nosenko’s answers, laughed out loud and asked me an unanswerable question, “How could your service ever have trusted such a person?”
-- MWT
