Succession

[Martin Weidmann]

This one is particularly noteworthy for its hypocrisy.   Martin claims to live in "Europe" but has bombarded this forum with critical comments about the US and US politics.  But I'm being "judgmental" for commenting on one event that happened in England.  That is verboten to him.  Members of this "board" should set me straight.  Martin speaks for these people as well because he allegedly lives on the same continent?  Bizarre.

Hey fool, I've been living alernately in the USA and Europe for more than 30 years now. That's the advantage of a dual nationality and that's what gives me a far better perspective about the differences between the two continents than you will ever have, living in your trailer.

You only need to read the off topic section of this board to find out who has really bombarded this forum with critical comments about the US and US politics and has been doing so forever, and it isn't me. I think you re a completely fanatical idiot, but I don't critize you for all the crap you say about the USA because, no matter how shortsighted and narrowminded it is, you have a right to say it. Just like I have the same right....right? 

You, on the other hand, who is constantly whining about free speech, has a problem with me pointing out the ugly side of America! Unlike you, I don't need to lie to expose what is going on with police killing innocent people. All it takes is posting a bunch of videos with bodycam footage as they can be found on You Tube.

But I'm being "judgmental" for commenting on one event that happened in England.

Yes, especially because you are lying about what actually happened in Birmingham.

You still don't care that in the US police frequently kills innocent people who are just walking on the sidewalk or have asked for help, but you get upset about a religious nutjob in England being arrested by unarmed police officer for violating a lawful order five times. Wanna see a hypocrite? Look in the mirror.

Let's ignore all the unjustified police killings, the mass shootings and all the school killings and complain about an English fanatic being arrested... Is that what you need to convince yourself that he US is still the home of the brave and the land of the free? How pitiful!

We had a great proud country that welcomed the oppressed and the poor and that stood for something until right wing fanatics like you f*cked it all up and blamed it on everybody except themselves.

[John Iacoletti]

Another steaming pile of “Richard Smith” BS. What “current affairs in Texas”? What “hate” of religion?

[Charles Collins]

This little tidbit is also from “The Death of a President” by William Manchester. This book enlightens by providing a lot of behind the scenes details that seem to only be possible because of Manchester’s relationships with the Kennedys and JFK’s close associates. Anyway, this snip is from the morning of 11/23/63 as Schlesinger drove McNamara home from the White House. And, I suppose, it should be related to the succession (as one of the results).


McNamara was a registered Republican. Schlesinger was a zealous Democrat, and despite his silence on this point his convictions about the campaign were far more partisan than the Secretary’s. He wondered whether Lyndon Johnson should be his party’s candidate in the coming election. Already he was looking ahead to the convention in Atlantic City. After leaving Dupont Circle he conferred with Chairman John Bailey, asking him whether it would be possible to deny the new President the nomination. John, according to his account, replied that “it might be technically feasible, but the result would be to lose the election for the Democrats.” Schlesinger suggested that the party was likely to lose anyway, that either Rockefeller or Nixon would win by carrying “the big industrial states.” He then added perceptively, “But I suppose that Johnson is astute enough to recognize this too, which means that he may be driven to an aggressive liberal program.” This judgment was reached on the thirty-sixth President’s first full day in office, before he had made a single move in any direction, and it came from a Democrat who was pondering the wisdom of forfeiting the election, “regardless of merits,” to beat him. Yet it would be hard to find a shrewder appraisal of the Johnsonian domestic program that would later emerge.


It is somewhat surprising to me that Schlesinger had that conversation with John Bailey. I think that the world would have been a much different place if JFK had not been assassinated on 11/22/63.

[Steve M. Galbraith]

This little tidbit is also from “The Death of a President” by William Manchester. This book enlightens by providing a lot of behind the scenes details that seem to only be possible because of Manchester’s relationships with the Kennedys and JFK’s close associates. Anyway, this snip is from the morning of 11/23/63 as Schlesinger drove McNamara home from the White House. And, I suppose, it should be related to the succession (as one of the results).


McNamara was a registered Republican. Schlesinger was a zealous Democrat, and despite his silence on this point his convictions about the campaign were far more partisan than the Secretary’s. He wondered whether Lyndon Johnson should be his party’s candidate in the coming election. Already he was looking ahead to the convention in Atlantic City. After leaving Dupont Circle he conferred with Chairman John Bailey, asking him whether it would be possible to deny the new President the nomination. John, according to his account, replied that “it might be technically feasible, but the result would be to lose the election for the Democrats.” Schlesinger suggested that the party was likely to lose anyway, that either Rockefeller or Nixon would win by carrying “the big industrial states.” He then added perceptively, “But I suppose that Johnson is astute enough to recognize this too, which means that he may be driven to an aggressive liberal program.” This judgment was reached on the thirty-sixth President’s first full day in office, before he had made a single move in any direction, and it came from a Democrat who was pondering the wisdom of forfeiting the election, “regardless of merits,” to beat him. Yet it would be hard to find a shrewder appraisal of the Johnsonian domestic program that would later emerge.


It is somewhat surprising to me that Schlesinger had that conversation with John Bailey. I think that the world would have been a much different place if JFK had not been assassinated on 11/22/63.

Caro, Dallek and other historians I've read say that LBJ only vaguely mentioned his "Great Society" programs during the campaign against Goldwater. And certainly nothing in detail about that enormous number of racial and poverty programs that were passed. In their accounts he essentially ran as a moderate and portrayed Goldwater as an extremist. I'll suggest that the very liberal and partisan Schlesinger would have recommended a liberal program for LBJ no matter what the situation was <g>.

Here's Dallek: "Democrats watching the rise of Goldwater's candidacy were gleeful. "It begins to look as though the Republicans are really going on a Kamikaze mission in November," ADA president John Roche wrote [LBJ press secretary] Billy Moyers in June."

"But taking nothing for granted, Johnson insisted on a tough, hard driving campaign. He saw "Goldwaterism" as the 'outgrowth of long public unrest with Big Government, Big Spending..and feeling that Washington doesn't understand our problems." He wanted to broaden the Democratic Party base by reaching out to independents and Republicans."

Ironic that he considered the public's "unrest" about Big Government and then, after being elected, passed the largest series of government programs since the New Deal if not ever.

As to Manchester: I think LBJ was right to be worried about the book, about how it would portray him. Manchester had to curry favor with the Kennedys, especially Jackie, in order to get access; without their contribution he has no book. So he's going to go easy on JFK at the possible expense of LBJ. And we all know about the conflicts between LBJ and RFK and the "Kennedy mafia". It apparently got much worse later but it was bad at the time of the assassination.

[Charles Collins]

Caro, Dallek and other historians I've read say that LBJ only vaguely mentioned his "Great Society" programs during the campaign against Goldwater. And certainly nothing in detail about that enormous number of racial and poverty programs that were passed. In their accounts he essentially ran as a moderate and portrayed Goldwater as an extremist. I'll suggest that the very liberal and partisan Schlesinger would have recommended a liberal program for LBJ no matter what the situation was <g>.

Here's Dallek: "Democrats watching the rise of Goldwater's candidacy were gleeful. "It begins to look as though the Republicans are really going on a Kamikaze mission in November," ADA president John Roche wrote [LBJ press secretary] Billy Moyers in June."

"But taking nothing for granted, Johnson insisted on a tough, hard driving campaign. He saw "Goldwaterism" as the 'outgrowth of long public unrest with Big Government, Big Spending..and feeling that Washington doesn't understand our problems." He wanted to broaden the Democratic Party base by reaching out to independents and Republicans."

Ironic that he considered the public's "unrest" about Big Government and then, after being elected, passed the largest series of government programs since the New Deal if not ever.

As to Manchester: I think LBJ was right to be worried about the book, about how it would portray him. Manchester had to curry favor with the Kennedys, especially Jackie, in order to get access; without their contribution he has no book. So he's going to go easy on JFK at the possible expense of LBJ. And we all know about the conflicts between LBJ and RFK and the "Kennedy mafia". It apparently got much worse later but it was bad at the time of the assassination.

Evelyn was packing; Mac Bundy had assigned Maxwell Taylor’s old EOB office to her. She knew the Attorney General wanted the West Wing cleared of President Kennedy’s belongings, but she felt no sense of urgency, and she even asked Cecil Stoughton to photograph the newly decorated rooms while JFK bric-a-brac was still there. Then LBJ unexpectedly appeared and asked her to step into the oval office. “Yes, sir,” she said, and obediently followed.

  President Johnson sat on one of the two facing divans. Evelyn started toward the rocking chair, veered away, and sank on the opposite couch. According to her recollection he said, “I need you more than you need me. But because of overseas”—presumably a reference to the necessity for shoring up confidence abroad—“I also need a transition. I have an appointment at 9:30. Can I have my girls in your office by 9:30?”

  He was giving her less than an hour. She said faintly, “Yes, Mr. President.”

  Muggsy O’Leary, who was standing by Evelyn’s desk, admiring the new red carpeting, overheard the conversation. Of Johnson he felt there was “anxiety on his part to get in.”1

  Johnson then said to Evelyn, “Do you think I could get Bill Moyers in Ken O’Donnell’s office?”

  She didn’t know how to reply. She lacked any influence with Kennedy’s chief of staff. After an awkward pause she faltered, “I don’t know, Mr. President.”

  Withdrawing in confusion, she encountered the Attorney General in her own office. She sobbed, “Do you know he asked me to be out by 9:30?”

  The younger Kennedy was appalled. He had just come in from the South Lawn to see how the moving was progressing, but he hadn’t counted on this. He said, “Oh, no!”

.
.
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As one Chief Executive’s furnishings departed, another’s arrived. Behind Evelyn’s desk a huge gold-framed portrait of Lyndon Johnson, brought over from his Vice Presidential office, was swiftly hung.3


Yes, I agree that Manchester was partial to JFK and his family. However, LBJ had one of the biggest egos around. We went from JFK’s policy of, essentially,“the war is for the South Vietnamese to fight” to LBJ’s policy of, essentially, “I am not going to be the first US President to lose a war”. LBJ was a very unpopular president, especially with the generation who was of age to be drafted into military service.

[Steve M. Galbraith]

Here are LBJ's approval ratings (Gallup). He's up around 55-60% approval through 1965 and then mostly fades until the very end.

[Charles Collins]

Here are LBJ's approval ratings (Gallup). He's up around 55-60% approval through 1965 and then mostly fades until the very end.

I believe that LBJ lacked foresight that JFK had. Here’s an example from pages 315-316 of “The Death of a President” by William Manchester:


Kennedy was no more a traitor to his class than Roosevelt had been. But as the son of a financial buccaneer who had become one of FDR’s ablest advisers on fiscal reform—the Securities and Exchange Commission and the integrity it brought modern markets were largely creations of Joe Kennedy—JFK had been alert to the vulnerability of the economy to blind panic. During his first week in the executive mansion he had designed an intricate prearrangement to safeguard against such panic. On February 3, 1961, he had sent his proposal to the Congress as a major message, and on the afternoon of November 22, 1963, it lay on the desk of Joe Fowler, Douglas Dillon’s surrogate.

  Historically the relationship between the Treasury and the mansion had always been intimate. The United States was, after all, the oldest and greatest capitalistic democracy, and the two great buildings, standing on either side of East Executive Avenue, were actually linked by an underground tunnel. Since 1902 the Secret Service, as an arm of the Treasury Department, had tightened the bond. Fowler thought first of the Service; he called Chief Rowley and asked that adequate security arrangements be made for the Vice President and the Speaker of the House. Rowley assured him that this was being done. Fowler’s second call was to Robert McNamara, the ranking Cabinet member in Washington.4 Like the men in the White House, he wanted to be sure that 86972 was reversing course. The Secretary of Defense was talking to the Attorney General on another line, but an aide relayed word that the aircraft was on its way back. They hung up, and it was then that Fowler remembered the plan Kennedy had drafted for just such an extremity as today’s.

  To prevent them from turning world markets into casinos, with the United States as the heavy loser, Kennedy had set up what he called a “swap arrangement” with the central banks of other countries. The U.S.A. literally swapped its money for theirs. He had ordered the Treasury to accumulate enormous stocks of pounds, marks, lire, yen, pesos, rands, guilders, French francs and Swiss francs—of every form of international currency. These had then been locked up. They constituted a kind of insurance: the President left a standing order that in any emergency they should all be released at once, with massive offers of foreign exchange being made to counter any dollars thrown on the table. The first occasion for the measure was to be his own violent death.

  Briefly, the President’s strategy was this. The first step was to see that all government security markets suspended trading at once. Second, Fowler instructed Alfred Hayes, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to call Keith Funston of the New York Stock Exchange and Ted Etherington of Amex, requesting them to close down. The gongs rang, and just in time; the assassination of the President, coupled with a shocking vegetable oil scandal which had been exposed earlier in the day, had sent the Big Board into a dizzy spiral. Clearing the floors provided a respite. In itself it was no exploit. Funston, in fact, had anticipated the Treasury. The crux of Kennedy’s design lay abroad. The major risk was speculation against the dollar. Such piracy is easy to detect. Sharks buy gold, betting that the price will rise from $35 an ounce to $40, say, or $45. Stopping them is not so easy, and no solution can be improvised after the balloon of fear has gone up.

  It worked magnificently. The key man was Al Hayes, because New York’s Federal Reserve is more than a reserve bank; it also serves as the government’s fiscal agent. Luckily for Hayes, foreign exchanges had closed before the assassination. Nevertheless America’s great vaults were opened that afternoon, and next day the bales of bills were to be used. On Saturday a few European gold markets opened, notably London’s and Zurich’s. On both, corsairs reached for the panic button. The Kennedy swap blocked them completely. Their dollars were taken, but in return they received other tender, not gold. (On Monday the Jolly Roger was hoisted again—after a few passes the speculators realized the extent of America’s preparations and withdrew. Meanwhile in the United States Wall Street was given the weekend plus an additional twenty-four hours of breathing time. Declaration of a bank holiday would have been alarming, so David Rockefeller, a friend of the Kennedys, persuaded his brother Nelson to halt trading as “a special mark of respect” for the late President. By Tuesday everything was steady.) The entire operation was a financial masterpiece, conducted on so high a plane that the oil and gas men of Dallas who had traduced JFK as a “Comsymp” enemy of free enterprise never even understood what was happening.


And I think that JFK had the foresight to see that the war in Vietnam was not going to be won by inserting bonafide U.S. combat troops and escalating the effort like LBJ did.

[Charles Collins]

Here’s a footnote from page 610 of “The Death of a President” by William Manchester that I think demonstrates a fundamental difference between JFK and LBJ. LBJ said that he wanted to continue the work of JFK. But, sadly, I cannot imagine that, at least once the war in Vietnam grew, LBJ had time to continue this JFK practice:


Kennedy personally wrote the family of every American who died in uniform during his Presidency. The lines to Box 813, Kirbyville, Texas, are particularly eloquent, but there were between forty and fifty such letters each month. Whenever one of them produced a reply, he invited the widow and children to Washington for a talk in the Rose Garden.