Government officials were rightly concerned that they might be pressured into WWIII if the public were erroneously led to believe that Oswald was involved with the Cubans or Russians. They had a legitimate, non-conspiratorial motive to convince the public of Oswald's guilt. First, because the evidence proved Oswald was guilty beyond any doubt. Second, because there was no reason to believe then or over 50 years later that the Russians, Cubans or anyone other than Oswald was responsible. Because of Oswald's nutty political background, Hoover and others understood there was a very real possibility that some would try to use that to convince the public of the involvement of the Commies. And the United States could have been drawn into a war on the basis of a falsehood.
"Government officials were rightly concerned that they might be pressured into WWIII if the public were erroneously led to believe that Oswald was involved with the Cubans or Russians."I call BS.
The government was full of hawks who pushed JFK to invade Cuba, send combat troops to SE Asia, some
even wanted the US fire off a nuclear first strike against the USSR. Ever hear of operation Northwoods?
They weren't afraid of American public opinion. If they were they wouldn't have sent millions of men
to fight in the rice paddies of Indochina.
Nothing more than a lame excuse for the failed cover up.
'64 Memo by Joint Chiefs of Staff
Discussing Widening of the War Memorandum from Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary of Defense Mc-
Namara, Jan. 22, 1964, "Vietnam and Southeast Asia."
1. National Security Action Memorandum No. 273 makes
clear the resolve of the President to ensure victory over the ex-
ternally directed and supported communist insurgency in South
Vietnam. In order to achieve that victory, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are of the opinion that the United States must be prepared
to put aside many of the self-imposed restrictions which now
limit our efforts, and to undertake bolder actions which may em-
body greater risks.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly mindful that our
fortunes in South Vietnam are an accurate barometer of our
fortunes in all of Southeast Asia. It is our view that if the U.S.
program succeeds in South Vietnam it will go far toward stabilizing
the total Southeast Asia situation. Conversely, a loss of South
Vietnam to the communists will presage an early erosion of
the remainder of our position in that subcontinent.
3. Laos, existing on a most fragile foundation now, would not
be able to endure the establishment of a communist--or pseudo
neutralist--state on its eastern flank. Thailand, less strong today
than a month ago by virtue of the loss of Prime Minister Sarit,
would probably be unable to withstand the pressures of infiltration
from the north should Laos collapse to the communists in its
turn. Cambodia apparently has estimated that our prospects in
South Vietnam are not promising and, encouraged by the actions
of the French, appears already to be seeking an accommodation
with the communists. Should we actually suffer defeat in South
Vietnam, there is little reason to believe that Cambodia would
maintain even a pretense of neutrality.
4. In a broader sense, the failure of our programs in South
Vietnam would have heavy influence on the judgments of Burma,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea,
and the Republic of the Philippines with respect to U.S. durability,
resolution, and trustworthiness. Finally, this being the first real test
of our determination to defeat the communist wars of national
liberation formula, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there
would be a corresponding unfavorable effect upon our image in
Africa and in Latin America.
5. All of this underscores the pivotal position now occupied by
South Vietnam in our world-wide confrontation with the com-
munists and the essentiality that the conflict there would be
brought to a favorable end as soon as possible. However, it
would be unrealistic to believe that a complete suppression of the
insurgency can take place in one or even two years. The British
effort in Malaya is a recent example of a counterinsurgency effort
which required approximately ten years before the bulk of the
rural population was brought completely under control of the
government, the police were able to maintain order, and the
armed forces were able to eliminate the guerrilla strongholds.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that, in keeping
with the guidance in NSAM 273, the United States must make
plain to the enemy our determination to see the Vietnam cam-
paign through to a favorable conclusion. To do this, we must
prepare for whatever level of activity may be required and, being
prepared, must then proceed to take actions as necessary to
achieve our purposes surely and promptly.
7. Our considerations, furthermore, cannot be confined en-
tirely to South Vietnam. Our experience in the war thus far leads
us to conclude that, in this respect, we are not now giving suffi-
cient attention to the broader area problems of Southeast Asia.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that our position in Cambodia,
our attitude toward Laos, our actions in Thailand, and our great
effort in South Vietnam do not comprise a compatible and inte-
grated U.S. policy for Southeast Asia. U.S. objectives in Southeast
Asia cannot be achieved by either economic, political, or military
measures alone. All three fields must be integrated into a single,
broad U.S. program for Southeast Asia. The measures recom-
mended in this memorandum are a partial contribution to such
a program.
8. Currently, we and the South Vietnamese are fighting the war
on the enemy's terms. He has determined the locale, the timing,
and the tactics of the battle while our actions are essentially re-
active. One reason for this is the fact that we have obliged our-
selves to labor under self-imposed restrictions with respect to
impeding external aid to the Viet Cong. These restrictions in-
clude keeping the war within the boundaries of South Vietnam,
avoiding the direct use of U.S. combat forces, and limiting U.S.
direction of the campaign to rendering advice to the Government
of Vietnam. These restrictions, while they may make our inter-
national position more readily defensible, all tend to make the
task in Vietnam more complex, time-consuming, and in the end,
more costly. In addition to complicating our own problem, these
self-imposed restrictions may well now be conveying signals of
irresolution to our enemies--encouraging them to higher levels of
vigor and greater risks. A reversal of attitude and the adoption
of a more aggressive program would enhance greatly our ability to
control the degree to which escalation will occur. It appears
probable that the economic and agricultural disappointments
suffered by Communist China, plus the current rift with the
Soviets, could cause the communists to think twice about under-
taking a large-scale military adventure in Southeast Asia.
9. In adverting to actions outside of South Vietnam, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that the focus of the counter-
insurgency battle lies in South Vietnam itself, and that the war
must certainly be fought and won primarily in the minds of the
Vietnamese people. At the same time, the aid now coming to the
Viet Cong from outside the country in men, resources, advice, and
direction is sufficiently great in the aggregate to be significant--
both as help and as encouragement to the Viet Cong. It is our
conviction that if support of the insurgency from outside South
Vietnam in terms of operational direction, personnel, and ma-
terial were stopped completely, the character of the war in South
Vietnam would be substantially and favorably altered. Because
of this conviction, we are wholly in favor of executing the covert
actions against North Vietnam which you have recently proposed
to the President. We believe, however, that it would be idle to
conclude that these efforts will have a decisive effect on the com-
munist determination to support the insurgency; and it is our
view that we must therefore be prepared fully to undertake a
much higher level of activity, not only for its beneficial tactical
effect, but to make plain our resolution, both to our friends and
to our enemies.
10. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the
United States must make ready to conduct increasingly bolder
actions in Southeast Asia; specifically as to Vietnam to:
a. Assign to the U.S. military commander responsibilities for
the total U.S. program in Vietnam.
b. Induce the Government of Vietnam to turn over to the
United States military commander, temporarily, the actual tac-
tical direction of the war.
c. Charge the United States military commander with complete
responsibility for conduct of the program against North Vietnam.
d. Overfly Laos and Cambodia to whatever extent is necessary
for acquisition of operational intelligence.
e. Induce the Government of Vietnam to conduct overt ground
operations in Laos of sufficient scope to impede the flow of
personnel and material southward.
f. Arm, equip, advise, and support the Government of Vietnam
in its conduct of aerial bombing of critical targets in North Viet-
nam and in mining the sea approaches to that country.
g. Advise and support the Government of Vietnam in its con-
duct of large-scale commando raids against critical targets in
North Vietnam.
h. Conduct aerial bombing of key North Vietnam targets, using
U.S. resources under Vietnamese cover, and with the Vietnamese
openly assuming responsibility for the actions.
i. Commit additional U.S. forces, as necessary, in support of
the combat action within South Vietnam.
j. Commit U.S. forces as necessary in direct actions against
North Vietnam.
11. It is our conviction that any or all of the foregoing actions
may be required to enhance our position in Southeast Asia. The
past few months have disclosed that considerably higher levels of
effort are demanded of us if U.S. objectives are to be attained.
12. The governmental reorganization which followed the coup
d'etat in Saigon should be completed very soon, giving basis for
concluding just how strong the Vietnamese Government is going
to be and how much of the load they will be able to bear them-
selves. Additionally, the five-month dry season, which is just now
beginning, will afford the Vietnamese an opportunity to exhibit
their ability to reverse the unfavorable situation in the critical
Mekong Delta. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will follow these im-
portant developments closely and will recommend to you pro-
gressively the execution of such of the above actions as are
considered militarily required, providing, in each case, their de-
tailed assessment of the risks involved.
13. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the strategic im-
portance of Vietnam and of Southeast Asia warrants preparations
for the actions above and recommend that the substance of this
memorandum be discussed with the Secretary of State."http://www.jfk-info.com/files.htm
